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Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise

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Abstract

Mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise are represented in the form of generalized median voter schemes for collective decision-making in the terms of families of right and left coalition systems. This approach allows for applying the results, obtained in the theory of social choice, to designing strategy-proof mechanisms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    V. N. Burkov, M. B. Iskakov & N. A. Korgin

Authors
  1. V. N. Burkov
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  2. M. B. Iskakov
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  3. N. A. Korgin
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Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.N. Burkov, M.B. Iskakov, N.A. Korgin, 2008, published in Problemy Upravleniya, 2008, No. 4, pp. 38–47.

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Burkov, V.N., Iskakov, M.B. & Korgin, N.A. Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise. Autom Remote Control 71, 1681–1694 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117910080163

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117910080163

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