Abstract
Continued was a previous study of the peculiarities of the forbidden-situation games that analyzed the guaranteed results for various sequences of the participants’ actions. Consideration now was given to the deformations of the Nash and Pareto equilibria by the mutual actions of the game participants on the set of permissible controls. The general constructions are illustrated by the analytical solutions for the Cournot model of competitive interaction of two manufacturing companies complemented by a constraint on the total raw-material resource.
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References
Tokarev, V.V., Guaranteed Results in Games with Forbidden Situations, Autom. Remote Control, 2009, no. 6, pp. 1026–1042.
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Original Russian Text © V.V. Tokarev, 2009, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2009, No. 7, pp. 127–138.
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Tokarev, V.V. Peculiarities of equilibria in the forbidden-situation games. Autom Remote Control 70, 1206–1216 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511790907011X
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511790907011X