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Mathematical models of formation of rational organizational hierarchies

  • Control in Social Economic Systems
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Abstract

A survey of Russian and foreign papers devoted to one of the burning trends of the theory of control of social and economic systems, i.e., mathematical models of formational of rational organization hierarchies is made. The following lines of investigations are emphasized: multilevel symmetrical hierarchies, hierarchies of knowledge, multilevel hierarchies of data processing, hierarchies and command theory, hierarchies of decision-making, hierarchies and contracts theory, and general model of optimal hierarchies search.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    M. V. Gubko

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Original Russian Text © M.V. Gubko, 2008, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2008, No. 9, pp. 114–139.

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 07-07-00078-a.

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Gubko, M.V. Mathematical models of formation of rational organizational hierarchies. Autom Remote Control 69, 1552–1575 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117908090105

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