Abstract
A model of the optimal multilevel organization is described. Its originality is determined by its multilevel character, the optimal hierarchy structure being the internal parameter examined together with the “classical” organization theory parameters, such as technology, number of agents and principals, their types and effort levels, stimulation mechanisms. The key assumption is the additivity of principals’ contributions to the total profit of the organization. A particular case of the model with the logarithmic profit function is examined in detail.
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Original Russian Text © S.P. Mishin, 2008, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2008, No. 7, pp. 98–112.
This work was supported by the grant of President of the Russian Federation, project no. MK-8928.2006.1 and by the National Science Assistance Foundation.
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Mishin, S.P. Optimal multilevel organization modelling for active contributions of principals. Autom Remote Control 69, 1188–1200 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117908070102
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117908070102