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Analytical expression of the expected values of capital at voting in the stochastic environment

  • Control in Social Economic Systems
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Abstract

In the simplest variant of the model of collective decision making in the stochastic environment, the participants were segregated into egoists and a group of collectivists. “Proposal of the environment” is the stochastically generated vector of algebraic increments of capitals. The social dynamics was defined by the sequence of proposals accepted by threshold-majority voting. Analytical expressions of the expected values of the capitals of participants, collectivists and egoists were obtained. Distinctions of some principles of group voting were discussed.

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Original Russian Text © P.Yu. Chebotarev, 2006, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhonika, 2006, No. 3, pp. 152–165.

This paper was recommended for publication by F.T. Aleskerov, a member of the Editorial Board

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Chebotarev, P.Y. Analytical expression of the expected values of capital at voting in the stochastic environment. Autom Remote Control 67, 480–492 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511790603012X

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511790603012X

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