Advertisement

Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 80, Issue 9, pp 1745–1753 | Cite as

Spice-Models with Independent Agents

  • O. I. GorbanevaEmail author
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

In this paper, the models of social and private interests coordination engines (SPICE-models) with equal independent agents are studied. The existence and uniqueness of Nash and Pareto-optimal equilibria are proved. These equilibria satisfy resource monotonicity (RM) but not population monotonicity (PM) and anonymity (ANO). Also a result on the system compatibility of the model is established.

Keywords

SPICE-models social welfare function index of system compatibility system-compatible model 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 18-010-00594.

References

  1. 1.
    Burkov, V.N. and Kondrat'ev, V.V., Mekhanizmy funktsionirovaniya organizatsionnykh sistem (Mechanisms of Functioning of Organizational Systems), Moscow: Nauka, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Germeier, Yu.B. and Vatel', I.A., Games with the Bierarchical Vector of Interests, Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR, Tekh. Kibern., 1974, no. 3, pp. 54–69.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Gorbaneva, O.I. and Ougolnitsky, G.A., Interests Coordination Mechanisms in Resource Allocation Model, Sist. Upravlen. Inform. Tekhn., 2014, no. 57(3.2), pp. 225–232.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Gorbaneva, O.I. and Ougolnitsky, G.A., Models of Social and Private Interests Coordination in Control Systems, XII Vserossiiskoe soveshchanie po prohlemam upravleniya (VSPU-2014) (XII All-Russia Meeting on Control Problems), Inst. Probl. Upravl., 2014, pp. 5282–5289.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Gorbaneva, O.I. and Ougolnitsky, G.A., Models of Social and Private Interests Coordination. I: System Compatibility, Econom. Menedzh. Sist. Upravlen., 2017, no. 4.1(26), pp. 194–200.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Gorbaneva, O.I. and Ougolnitsky, G.A., Price of Anarchy and Control Mechanisms in Models of Social and Private Interests Coordination, Mat. Teor. Igr Prilozh., 2015, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 50–73.MathSciNetzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Gorelik, V.A., Gorelov, M.A., and Kononenko, A.F., Analiz konfliktnykh situatsii v sistemakh upravleniya (Analysis of Conflicts in Control Systems), Moscow: Radio i Svyaz', 1991.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Gorbaneva, O.I. and Ougolnitsky, G.A., Models of Concordance of Public and Private Interests in Control Systems, Contribut. Game Theory Manage., 2015, vol. 8, pp. 47–57.MathSciNetzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Gorbaneva, O.I. and Ougolnitsky, G.A., System Compatibility, Price of Anarchy and Control Mechanisms in the Models of Concordance of Private and Public Interests, Adv. Syst. Sci. AppL, 2015, vol. 15(1), pp. 45–59.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Moulin, H. and Thomson, W., Can Everyone Benefit from Growth? Two Difficulties, J. Math. Econom., 1988, vol. 17, pp. 339–345.MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Papadimitriou, C.H., Algorithms, Games, and the Internet, Proc. 33th Symposium on Theory of Computing, Heraklion, Greece, 2001, pp. 749–753.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer SciencesSouthern Federal UniversityRostov-on-DonRussia

Personalised recommendations