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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 80, Issue 6, pp 1164–1176 | Cite as

A Game-Theoretic Model of Agreement on Limitation of Transboundary Air Pollution

  • A. A. VasinEmail author
  • A. G. DivtsovaEmail author
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
  • 3 Downloads

Abstract

This paper considers a model of agreements for the problem of transboundary air pollution by industrial emissions. The interaction of countries is described by a repeated game with side payments. The aim is to find the existence conditions of a subgame perfect equilibrium that implements a Pareto-optimal strategy profile in each period of the game.

Keywords

repeated game Nash equilibrium subgame perfect equilibrium Pareto-optimal strategy profile 

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Notes

Acknowledgments

A.A. Vasin acknowledges the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 16-01-00353.

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Moscow State UniversityMoscowRussia

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