Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Persuading the independent: understanding why interest groups engage with EU agencies

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Interest Groups & Advocacy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

What motivates interest groups to engage with European Union (EU) agencies? Authors have recently looked into the interaction between interest groups and these European regulators. This article sets out to discover new explanations for interest group behaviour and to add mechanisms to established explanatory factors by looking at this novel context for interest group literature. It employs an in-depth qualitative study using interviews with high-level interest group representatives that interact with the European Food Safety Authority. A novel finding is that interest groups, specifically business actors, are motivated by preventing reputational threats to the agency. This article, therefore, extends insights from bureaucratic reputation literature to interest group scholarship. Furthermore, interest groups are motivated by factors found in interest group literature such as influence on regulatory policy, gaining access to venues and appeasing their members. This article aids future research efforts in unravelling why interest groups engage with EU regulatory agencies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Examples include ‘How capable are you to make your voice heard in European policymaking?’ (asked to BA1) instead of ‘How influential are you?’ and using the term ‘stakeholder’ instead of ‘interest group’ for citizen groups as they are more comfortable with it.

  2. See Arras and Braun (2018) for reputational expectations of EU agencies from their engagement with interest groups and Trapp and Laursen (2017) arguing that interest groups maintain a positive public image of policymakers through media appearances.

  3. [x] is used instead of information that compromises the respondent’s anonymity.

  4. Interest groups are sometimes invited by EFSA, suggesting that the agency also wants interest groups to engage. However, for consistency with similar findings, this is discussed under behavioural control. .

References

  • Ajzen, I. 2001. Nature and Operation of Attitudes. Annual Review of Psychology 52: 27–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ajzen, I. 2011. The Theory of Planned Behaviour: Reactions and Reflections. Psychology and Health 26 (9): 1113–1127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ajzen, I., and D. Albarracín. 2007. Prediction and Change Behaviour: A Reasoned Action Approach. In Predicting and Change of Health Behaviour, ed. I. Ajzen, D. Albarracín, and R. Hornik, 3–21. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ajzen, I., and M. Fishbein. 1977. Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of Empirical Research. Psychological Bulletin 84 (5): 8–918.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arras, S., and C. Braun. 2018. Stakeholders Wanted! Why and How European Union Agencies Involve Non-state Stakeholders. Journal of European Public Policy 25 (9): 1257–1275.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barbieri, D., and E. Ongaro. 2008. EU agencies: what is common and what is distinctive compared with national-level public agencies. International Review of Administrative Sciences 74 (3): 395–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baroni, L., et al. 2014. Defining and classifying interest groups. Interest Groups and Advocacy 3 (2): 141–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berkhout, J., et al. 2015. Interest Organizations Across Economic Sectors: Explaining Interest Group Density in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (4): 462–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyers, J., and S. Arras. 2019. Who Feeds Information to Regulators? Stakeholder Diversity in European Union Regulatory Agency Consultations. Journal of Public Policy 58 (4): 836–855.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beyers, J., R. Eising, and W. Maloney. 2008. Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know? West European Politics 31 (6): 1103–1129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyers, J., et al. 2014. Let’s talk! On the Practice and Method of Interviewing Policy Experts. Interest Groups and Advocacy 3 (2): 174–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binderkrantz, A.S., H.H. Pedersen, and J. Beyers. 2017. What is Access? A Discussion of the Definition and Measurement of Interest Group Access. European Political Science 16 (3): 306–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bleich, E., and R.J. Pekkanen. 2015. Data Access, Research Transparency, and Interviews: The Interview Methods Appendix. Qualitative and Multi-Method Research 13 (1): 8–13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boehmke, F.J., S. Gailmard, and J.W. Patty. 2013. Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation Across Policy-Making Venues. Journal of Public Policy 33 (1): 3–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bouwen, P. 2002. Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The logic of Access. Journal of European Public Policy 9 (3): 365–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bouwen, P. 2004. Exchanging Access Goods for Access: A comparative Study of Business Lobbying in the European Union Institutions. European Journal of Political Research 43 (3): 337–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowen, G.A. 2006. Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts. International Journal of Qualitative Methods 5 (3): 2–9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Busuioc, E.M. 2010. The Accountability of European Agencies: Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices. Delft: Eburon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Busuioc, E.M., and D. Rimkutė. 2020. Meeting Expectations in the EU regulatory state? Regulatory Communications amid Conflicting Institutional Demands. Journal of European Public Policy 27 (4): 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, D.P. 2010. Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, D.P., and G.A. Krause. 2012. Reputation and Public Administration. Public Administration Review 72 (1): 26–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, A.W., and P.A. Shotton. 2016. Changing the Face of Advocacy? Explaining Interest Organizations' Use of Social Media Strategies. Political Communication 33 (3): 374–391.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chamon, M. 2016. Setting the Scene. EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration, 4–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Chiti, E. 2013. European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment. European Law Journal 19 (1): 93–110.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chubb, J.E. 1983. Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coen, D. 1998. European business Interest and the Nation State: Large Firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States. Journal of Public Policy 18 (1): 75–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dahl, R.A. 1957. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science 2 (3): 201–2015.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dal Bó, E. 2006. Regulatory Capture: A Review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22 (2): 203–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Desmidt, S., and Meyfroodt, K. 2020. What Motivates Politicians to Use Strategic Plans as a Decision-Making Tool? Insights from the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Public Management Review, 1–28.

  • EFSA. 2016. EFSA Stakeholder Engagement Approach. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EFSA%20Stakeholder%20engagement%20approach_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2017.

  • EFSA. 2017. Stakeholders Registered List. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/stakeholders-registered-list.pdf%0D. Accessed 22 March 2017.

  • Flöthe, L. 2019. Technocratic or Democratic Interest Representation? How Different Types of Information Affect Lobbying Success. Interest Groups and Advocacy 8 (2): 165–183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flöthe, L., and A. Rasmussen. 2018. Public Voices in the Heavenly Chorus? Group type Bias and Opinion Representation. Journal of European Public Policy 26 (6): 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Golden, M.M. 1998. Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8 (2): 245–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gormley, W.T.J. 1986. Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System. Polity 18 (4): 595–620.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Groenleer, M., M. Kaeding, and E. Versluis. 2010. Regulatory governance through agencies of the European Union? The Role of the European Agencies for Maritime and Aviation Safety in the Implementation of European transport Legislation. Journal of European Public Policy 17 (8): 1212–1230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpin, D.R. 2011. Explaining Policy Bandwagons: Organized Interest Mobilization and Cascades of Attention. Governance 24 (2): 205–230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpin, D.R., B. Fraussen, and A.J. Nownes. 2017. The Balancing Act of Establishing a Policy Agenda: Conceptualizing and Measuring Drivers of Issue Prioritization within Interest Groups. Governance 31 (2): 1–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heims, E.M. 2016. Explaining Coordination Between National Regulators in EU Agencies: The Role of Formal and Informal Social Organization. Public Administration 94 (4): 881–896.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Isaac, J.C. 2015. For a More Public Political Science. Perspectives on politics 13 (2): 269–283.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaya, C. 2019. Providing Information and Building Capacity: Interest Group Involvement in the Application of EU Law. West European Politics 42 (1): 25–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kroll, A. 2015. Explaining the Use of Performance Information by Public Managers: A Planned-Behavior Approach. American Review of Public Administration 45 (2): 201–215.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowery, D. 2007. Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying. Polity 39 (1): 29–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowery, D. 2013. Lobbying Influence: Meaning, Measurement and Missing. Interest Groups and Advocacy 2 (1): 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McKay, A.M. 2011. The Decision to Lobby Bureaucrats. Public Choice 147 (1/2): 123–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Migliorati, M. 2020. Relying on Agencies in Major European Union Legislative Measures. West European Politics 43 (1): 159–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ossege, C. 2015. Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies. Politics and Governance 3 (1): 101–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pecorino, P. 2015. Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty. Public Choice 162 (3/4): 243–262.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pérez Durán, I. 2018. Interest Group Representation in the Formal Design of European Union Agencies. Regulation and Governance 12 (2): 238–262.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J., and G.R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Stanford: Stanford Business Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pralle, S.B. 2003. Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy. Journal of Public Policy 23 (3): 233–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Princen, S., and B. Kerremans. 2008. Opportunity Structures in the EU Multi-Level System. West European Politics 31 (6): 1129–1146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rimkutė, D. 2015. Explaining Differences in Scientific Expertise Use: The Politics of Pesticides. Politics and Governance 3 (1): 114–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roederer-Rynning, C., and C. Daugbjerg. 2010. Power Learning or Path Dependency?: Investigating the Roots of the European Food Safety Authority. Public Administration 88 (2): 315–330.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scholten, M., and D. Scholten. 2017. From Regulation to Enforcement in the EU Policy Cycle: A New Type of Functional Spillover? Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (4): 925–942.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scholten, M., and M. van Rijsbergen. 2014. The Limits of Agencification in the European Union. German Law Journal 15 (7): 1223–1255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smismans, S. 2008. New Modes of Governance and the Participatory Myth. West European Politics 31 (5): 874–895.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toshkov, D. 2016. Research Design in Political Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Trapp, N.L., and B. Laursen. 2017. Inside Out: Interest groups’ “outside” Media Work as a Means to Manage “inside” Lobbying Efforts and Relationships with Politicians. Interest Groups and Advocacy 6 (2): 143–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yackee, S.W. 2019. The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science 22: 37–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yzer, M. 2012. Perceived Behavioral Control in Reasoned Action Theory: A Dual-Aspect Interpretation. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 640 (1): 101–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I thank Markus Haverland and Asya Zhelyazkova for their insightful comments and guidance. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for their help in improving the paper. Furthermore, I am indebted to the interest group representatives that took the time to tell me about their work. This work was supported by the Dutch Research Council (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), grant number 406.17.557.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062PA, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Rik Joosen

Authors
  1. Rik Joosen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rik Joosen.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix

Appendix

Assessing bias in population of registered stakeholders

These categories follow the categories used by Beyers and Arras (2019), as these were most aggregated (Table 3).

Table 3 Comparison of types of interest group between registered stakeholders (as of 20-02-2017) and EFSA consultation participation (from Beyers and Arras 2019)
Full size table

For the registered stakeholders, categories were aggregated from the categories used by EFSA itself. Business includes farmers and primary producers, businesses and food industry and distributor categories. Non-business includes consumers and environment. Experts includes associations of practitioners and academia.

For consultation data, two categories from Beyers and Arras were merged (regulated business and non-regulated business) as the registered stakeholder data make no distinction between these.

Interview methods table

Type

Status

Source

Format

Length

Recording

Coverage (%)

BA1 secretary general

Interview held via Skype on 12-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:54:26

Audio recording

23.83

BA2 director

Interview held via Skype on 19-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:53:56

Audio recording

56.12

BA3 director

Interview held via Skype on 26-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

01:47:52

Audio recording

24.65

BA4 deputy secretary general

Interview held via Skype on 28-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:50:01

Audio recording

50.73

BA5 advisor

Interview held via Skype on 28-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:44:02

Audio recording

53.83

BA6 Policy officer

Interview held via Skype on 03-05-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:20:54

Audio recording

56.34

BA7 secretary general

Interview held via Skype on 05-05-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:42:03

Audio recording

46.32

BA8 deputy director

Interview held in person on 19-05-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

01:18:07

Audio recording

37.40

BA9 secretariat officer

Interview held via Skype on 06-06-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:32:56

Audio recording

25.75

BA10 director

Interview held in person on 07-06-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:44:46

Audio recording

66.48

CG1 head of department

Interview held via Skype on 19-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:40:05

Audio recording

51.11

CG2 advisor

Interview held via Skype on 21-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:58:31

Audio recording

47.45

CG3 secretary general

Interview held via Skype on 26-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:21:24

Audio recording

53.47

CG4 advisor

Interview held via Skype on 03-05-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:37:47

Audio recording

63.77

PA1 representative

Interview held via Skype on 20-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:34:55

Audio recording

29.92

PA2 vice president

Interview held via Skype on 26-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:55:50

Audio recording

26.98

PA3 member

Interview held via Skype on 28-04-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:39:00

Audio recording

17.57

RI1 director

Interview held via Skype on 02-05-2017

Sample frame

Semi-structured

00:30:16

Audio recording

31.22

Academia

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Refused 12-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Refused 04-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Refused 07-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Refused 07-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Refused 07-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

No response

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Refused 05-05-2017

Sample frame

    

Business and food industry

Agreed to have interview, but did not manage to plan it

Sample frame

    

Distributors and HORECA

No response

Sample frame

    

Distributors and HORECA

Refused 13-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Distributors and HORECA

No response

Sample frame

    

Environmental/health NGOs and advocacy groups

Refused 05-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Environmental/health NGOs and advocacy groups

Refused 03-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Environmental/health NGOs and advocacy groups

Refused 10-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Environmental/health NGOs and advocacy groups

Refused 10-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Environmental/health NGOs and advocacy groups

No response

Sample frame

    

Farmers and primary producers

Refused 12-04-2017

Sample frame

    

Farmers and primary producers

No response

Sample frame

    

Farmers and primary producers

No response

Sample frame

    

Farmers and primary producers

No response

Sample frame

    

Farmers and primary producers

Refused 02-05-2017

Sample frame

    

Farmers and primary producers

No response

Sample frame

    

Firm

Interview held on 10-04-2017, but not used in research

Colleague at the same firm

Semi-structured

01:09:04

Audio recording

Confidentiality required

Firm

Refused 18-05-2017

Colleague

    

Topic list

Ask permission for recording

Introductions

What does your organisation do (in general)?

What interactions do you have with EFSA?

  • Stakeholder forum

  • (Online) consultations

  • Other

Could you give a recent example?

For each interaction:

  • General

    • Why do you do that, why did you engage?

  • Attitude

    • What outcome are you trying to achieve by engaging with EFSA?

    • Is that outcome likely to occur?

    • How important is that outcome for you?

    • What is the consequence of engagement for you as an organisation?

  • Subjective norm

    • Do any outside actors have expectations about your engagement with EFSA?

    • Constituency

    • General public

    • Other

    • What are these expectations?

    • Do you agree/comply with these expectations?

  • Behavioural control

    • How difficult is it to engage with EFSA (both in general and for you specifically)?

    • How capable are you as an organisation to engage with EFSA?

    • Do you have enough knowledge and experience to do so?

    • Do you have enough resources at your disposal?

    • Are you happy about how you engage with EFSA?

Can you give a different example (more general/more specific to your interests)?

[repeat list above]

Coding scheme and procedure

All interviews were fully transcribed. NVivo qualitative analysis software was used to code the interviews. First, three codes were established based on the three constructs of the planned behaviour approach:

  • Attitude

  • Subjective norm

  • Behavioural control

Starting with these three constructs allowed for structure while keeping the desired open inductive character of the analysis. All interview sections (a section being one piece of coherent narrative addressing a subject within an interview) were coded in there three categories. Occasionally, sections could be and were placed under multiple codes.

This step was followed by a three-step procedure: open, axial and selective coding. In open coding, each section of a transcript was assigned a code to summarize its content. If a section fitted a code that was already created, it was placed under that code. If it did not fit any other code, a new code was created. After this was done, the axial coding step involved looking at all the codes, merging those that fit well together and making a hierarchical structure of the codes. In the third stage, selective coding, the most relevant codes were selected to establish the narrative discussed in the results. This is where the subthemes of the results emerged. The eventual subthemes are:

  • Increasing predictability

  • Enhancing reputation

  • Improving risk assessment

  • Member base

  • Capacity

  • Responsiveness of the agency

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Joosen, R. Persuading the independent: understanding why interest groups engage with EU agencies. Int Groups Adv 10, 19–46 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-020-00110-z

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-020-00110-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation