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Government Debt Bias

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Abstract

Almost all governments issue large stocks of debt. Optimal taxation theory typically concludes that they should hold large stocks of assets. To reconcile facts and theory, we introduce two simple modifications into an otherwise standard optimal taxation model with commitment: government impatience and continuous debt limits. Two results are obtained. First, positive government debt is optimal for even minimal government impatience. Second, the optimality of negative government debt disappears even without impatience if discrete debt limits are replaced by very wide but continuous debt limits. We go on to quantify the implications for debt, interest rates and business cycle dynamics.

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Notes

  1. See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a review of this literature.

  2. An alternative route is being pursued by the political economy literature. See Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Debortoli and Nuñes (2013), Aguiar and Amador (2011, 2015) and Azzimonti (2011, 2015).

  3. It is also possible to argue, although in the absence of more detailed empirical evidence we do not wish to take a stand on this, that the “neoliberal consensus,” or the “end of history” in the sense of Fukuyama (1992), has been characterized by a considerable narrowing of this heterogeneity among policymakers over the sample period that we consider.

  4. The optimal taxation literature generally treats government spending as exogenous (and wasteful in terms of household utility) because of its acyclical or mildly procyclical nature in the data. Paquet and Ambler (1994) concluded that endogenizing government spending would imply that public spending would closely mimic private spending and would therefore overpredict the correlation of public spending with output.

  5. The negative government debt result of Aiyagari and others (2002) is based on a specific set of parameter values. Their paper does not discuss the generality of that result and its sensitivity to parameter values.

  6. To make complete markets problems more interesting, this is typically ruled out through an ad hoc restriction on the initial tax rate on debt.

  7. What matters in theses models is that households discount the future at a higher rate than the market real interest rate, as this literature does not specify a government objective function. This is because its applications typically do not deal with optimal policy issues.

  8. Relative to Aiyagari and others (2002), replacing a discrete debt limit by a continuous debt limit also reduces the government’s incentives for precautionary saving.

  9. As discussed in the introduction, the literature has suggested to interpret such costs as monitoring and administrative costs that depend on the stock of debt (or assets) outstanding.

  10. In the open economy literature, which frequently uses this type of transactions cost, the assumption of lump-sum redistribution is also standard.

  11. Post-crisis levels of debt are far higher, and levels of real interest rates are far lower, reflecting a number of exceptional circumstances that are not captured by our simple model. We only consider post-crisis data in two cases where the sample period would otherwise have been too short for meaningful econometric results.

  12. This parameter depends on one’s benchmark value for the proportion of time spent working in steady state. King and Rebelo (1999), in a business cycle model without distorting taxes, set \(\kappa =3.48\), but values lower than 3 can also be justified on that basis.

  13. We note that this excludes government transfer payments.

  14. We did not change this ratio across countries, so that calibrated steady-state tax revenue-to-GDP ratios are more similar across countries than they are in the data. There are three reasons for this choice. First, it makes comparison across different calibrations of γ and ϕ easier. Second, our model features only labor income taxes, while overall tax revenue has many other components that are not present in our model. And third, tax revenues to GDP ratios are not only determined by the level of government spending but also by the level of transfers, which are not present in our model.

  15. It can be shown that when positive steady-state growth is added to the model, the main difference is an increase in the steady-state real interest rate that is approximately equal to the real growth rate, with all other aspects of the steady state broadly unchanged.

  16. As we will see, in a modified Ramsey equilibrium the deterministic and stochastic steady states are close to each other.

  17. OECD (2007) reports 2006 ratios of government gross financial liabilities to GDP of 77.1 percent for the OECD average and 61.9 percent for the U.S.

  18. Let the gross rate of time preference be denoted by \(\tilde{\beta }=1/\beta\). Then Eq. (23) can be rewritten as \(r=\tilde{\beta }/\left( 1- \tilde{\beta }\frac{\phi }{4}\frac{b}{\ell }\right)\). The net real interest rate is approximately given by \(r^{n}=log(r)\). For small values of ϕ, and for \(\tilde{\beta }\simeq 1\), the derivative \(dr^{n}/d\left( \frac{b}{ 4\ell }\right)\) of this expression is approximately equal to ϕ.

  19. Exceptions: Belgium GDP 1992Q1–2007Q4 and Chile real interest rate 1995Q2–2007Q4.

  20. For the latter two, data for 2008–2015 are only used for unit root tests, to overcome sample size limitations, especially for labor taxes.

  21. The definition of the tax wedge in OECD (2016) is: “The tax wedge is defined as the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by an average single worker (a single person at 100 percent of average earnings) without children and the corresponding total labor cost for the employer. The average tax wedge measures the extent to which tax on labor income discourages employment. This indicator is measured in percentage of labor cost.”

  22. The rule is described in detail in Marcel and others (2001).

  23. Available at http://pythie.cepremap.cnrs.fr/mailman/listinfo/dynare.

  24. The main difference is that according to the third-order approximation the real interest rate exhibits a higher serial correlation (0.52 instead of 0.43) and a stronger negative correlation with GDP (−0.71 instead of −0.65).

  25. The transition to the stochastic steady state, computed using a global method and based on a particular history of shocks, exhibits similar behavior. See the working paper version of this paper (Kumhof and Yakadina 2007).

  26. The latter may be the main reason why debt-to-GDP ratios in developing countries are often comparatively low, see Reinhart and others (2003), which is related to our discussion of Chile above.

  27. Note that in each of the subplots, we shut down the shock whose serial correlation is not shown along the horizontal axis.

  28. The statistic cannot be computed for the Chilean tax wedge, which was constant at 7 percent throughout the entire sample period.

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Correspondence to Michael Kumhof.

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We are grateful to James Barker for excellent research assistance.

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Appendix: The Non-stochastic Steady State

Appendix: The Non-stochastic Steady State

We drop time subscripts to denote steady-state values of variables. The non-stochastic steady state of the economy is given by the system of five equations (11), (16), (19), (20) and (21) determining the variables \(c, \ell , b, \eta\) and \(\lambda\). Equations (19), (20) and (21) become

$$\eta =\frac{1}{c}\left( 1+\lambda \frac{1-\ell -\kappa \ell }{1-\ell } \right) +\lambda b\frac{1}{c^{2}}\left( \beta -\frac{1}{\gamma }\right) ,$$
(A1)
$$\eta =\frac{\kappa (1-\ell +\lambda )}{(1-\ell )^{2}}-\lambda \frac{1}{c} \frac{\phi }{4}\left( \frac{b}{\ell }\right) ^{2},$$
(A2)
$$2\frac{\phi }{4}\frac{b}{\ell }=\beta (1-\gamma )$$
(A3)

where we have combined (19) with (16). Consider the case of \(\lambda =0\). In that case, we would have \(\eta =1/c\) and \(\eta =\kappa /(1-\ell )\). Then by the consumer’s first-order condition (4), it would have to be true that \(\tau =0\). Such a case would only be possible in the first-best, which is only achievable if the government can accumulate a sufficient amount of assets to finance fiscal spending without any distortionary taxation. This is however ruled out in our model by condition (A3), which makes the steady-state debt stock positive. We can therefore rule out \(\lambda =0\). The remaining steady-state conditions are

$$c+g=\ell ,$$
(A4)
$$1-\frac{\kappa \ell }{1-\ell }=\frac{1}{c}\left( (1-\beta )b+\frac{\phi }{4} \frac{b^{2}}{\ell }\right) .$$
(A5)

In a first step, the steady-state values bc and l can be solved from (A3), (A4) and (A5). In a second step, the remaining equations (A1) and (A2) then determine \(\lambda\) and \(\eta\). The first step results in the quadratic equation for \(\ell\)

$$\left[ \kappa +1-\varphi \right] \ell ^{2}-\left[ 1+(\kappa +1)g-\varphi \right] \ell +g=0,$$
(A6)

where

$$\varphi =\frac{2\beta (1-\gamma )}{\phi }\left( 1-\frac{\beta (1+\gamma )}{2} \right) .$$
(A7)

There are therefore two possible solutions for steady-state labor, and by (A4) also for steady-state consumption. The roots of equation (A6) are given by

$$\ell _{1,2}=\frac{1+(\kappa +1)g-\varphi \pm \sqrt{(1+(\kappa +1)g-\varphi )^{2}-4g(\kappa +1-\varphi )}}{2(\kappa +1-\varphi )}.$$
(A8)

While both roots are positive for our parameterization, the smaller root implies a level of consumption very close to zero (\(c=0.0002\)) and a much lower welfare than the larger root. The smaller root can therefore be ruled out. This means that even for large fluctuations around the steady state, the use of a perturbation method that approximates the solution around the superior steady state remains appropriate.

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Kumhof, M., Yakadina, I. Government Debt Bias. IMF Econ Rev 65, 675–703 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-017-0035-3

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