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Combating corruption in Europe: a stimulus–response approach

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Abstract

What is the effect of external stimuli in curbing corruption at the national level? This article analyses the intervening impact of EU post-conditionality and GRECO monitoring on countries’ anti-corruption record. It finds that “soft governance” has a positive impact and stimulates national responses against corruption. This positive influence increases when is additionally conditioned by strong internal stimuli targeting corruption.

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Fig. 1

Note: The lines show in percentages the substantive allocation to criticism and recommendations from each annual CVM report

Fig. 2

Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicator (Control of Corruption) www.govindicators.org

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Notes

  1. In the case of Bulgaria, the 6 benchmarks were mainly set around the need for ‘non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption’, measures to fight corruption at the local level and a strategy to fight organized crime. Romania’s 4 targets were the investigations of high-level corruption as in the case of Bulgaria, but additionally the establishment of an integrity agency and the need for measures aimed at preventing corruption (European Commission 2006).

  2. The EU CVM reports are published twice a year, whilst the GRECO reports were released once every 3–5 years. GRECO analysis is based on meetings with public officials and members of civil society, but also the latter replies to questionnaires applied by GRECO. The EU reports are prepared after the Commission organizes expert missions to both countries three times a year. During these visits, the experts consult with the government, non-governmental organizations and the Commission’s local representative.

  3. The World Governance Indicators (WGI) are comparable across time. The Corruption Perception Index as compiled by Transparency International (TI) is comparable only from 2012. For other new indicators such as the Public Integrity Index, there are no time series data collected yet.

  4. GRECO’s principle 7 refers to the promotion and specialization of persons or bodies in charge of fighting corruption, and principle 3 refers to the independence and autonomy of all those involved in preventing, prosecuting and adjudicating corruption offences (Council of Europe 2016).

  5. Amongst the New EU12, other countries which did not adopt a national anti-corruption strategy include Malta, Lithuania, Cyprus and Czech Republic.

  6. In addition to Transparency International, a list of NGOs fight corruption comprises amongst others, in Romania: The Alliance for a Clean Romania (http://sar.org.ro), The Expert Forum (EFOR, http:expertforum.ro), The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP; http: riseproject.ro); and in Bulgaria: The Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, www.csd.bg) and its initiative the Coalition 2000 process.

  7. Open Government Partnership, http://www.opengovpartnership.org/, last accessed June 2016.

  8. The IPPI score on judicial independence ranges from 1 = heavily influenced to 7 = entirely independent. The Romanian score for judicial independence in 2016 was reported as 5.58 and for Bulgaria 3.5.

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Correspondence to Gabriela Borz.

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Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 1, 2 and 3.

Table 1 GRECO evaluation rounds for Romania and Bulgaria.
Table 2 GRECO evaluation per themes and national measures adopted.
Table 3 CVM reports for Romania and Bulgaria 2007–2014.

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Borz, G. Combating corruption in Europe: a stimulus–response approach. Eur Polit Sci 18, 217–233 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0151-1

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