Table 6 Debt responses by type

From: Breaking Bad: When Being Disadvantaged Incentivizes (Seemingly) Risky Behavior

  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
DEBT \(-0.038\)*** \(-\)0.038*** \(-0.037\)*** \(-0.045\)*** \(-0.051\)*** DEBT \(-0.067\)***
(0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0151) (0.0144)   (0.0201)
\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** \(\hbox {DEBT}^2\) 0.002***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)   (0.0004)
LA    \(-\)0.109    HAER \(-\)0.337
   (0.1149)     (0.2951)
ER   .071   \(-\)0.026   LANR \(-0.762\)**
  (0.1106)   (0.2350)    (0.323)
LA      \(-0.407\)* LAER \(-\)0.252
     (0.2443)   (0.3747)
ER*DEBT     0.017   HAER*DEBT 0.033
    (0.0229)    (0.0292)
ER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)     \(<0.001\)   LANR*DEBT 0.05
    (0.0005)    (0.0314)
LA*DEBT      0.036 LAER*DEBT 0.05
     (0.0236)   (0.0365)
LA*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)      \(-\)0.001 HAER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\) \(-\)0.001
     (0.0005)   (0.0006)
      LANR*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\) \(-\)0.001
       (0.0006)
      LAER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\) \(-\)0.001
       (0.0008)
CONSTANT 0.337*** 0.306** 0.373*** 0.347** 0.482*** CONSTANT 0.64***
(0.1160) (0.1254) (0.1215) (0.1540) (0.1460)   (0.2013)
Log. L \(-\)357.94 \(-\)357.73 \(-\)357.4877 \(-\)357.41 \(-\)356.31 Log. L \(-\)352.53
\(R^2\) 0.0364 0.037 0.0377 0.0379 0.0408 \(R\hat{2}\) 0.051
  1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***\(p<.01\), **\(p<.05\), and *\(p<.10\). \(N=557\). Dependent variable is subjects’ rejection decision (1 if reject; 0 if accept)