Breaking Bad: When Being Disadvantaged Incentivizes (Seemingly) Risky Behavior

Table 6 Debt responses by type

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
DEBT	\(-0.038\)***	\(-\)0.038***	\(-0.037\)***	\(-0.045\)***	\(-0.051\)***	DEBT	\(-0.067\)***
DEBT	(0.0114)	(0.0113)	(0.0114)	(0.0151)	(0.0144)		(0.0201)
\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)	0.002***
\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		(0.0004)
LA			\(-\)0.109			HAER	\(-\)0.337
LA			(0.1149)				(0.2951)
ER		.071		\(-\)0.026		LANR	\(-0.762\)**
ER		(0.1106)		(0.2350)			(0.323)
LA					\(-0.407\)*	LAER	\(-\)0.252
LA					(0.2443)		(0.3747)
ER*DEBT				0.017		HAER*DEBT	0.033
ER*DEBT				(0.0229)			(0.0292)
ER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)				\(<0.001\)		LANR*DEBT	0.05
ER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)				(0.0005)			(0.0314)
LA*DEBT					0.036	LAER*DEBT	0.05
LA*DEBT					(0.0236)		(0.0365)
LA*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)					\(-\)0.001	HAER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)	\(-\)0.001
					(0.0005)		(0.0006)
						LANR*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)	\(-\)0.001
							(0.0006)
						LAER*\(\hbox {DEBT}^2\)	\(-\)0.001
							(0.0008)
CONSTANT	0.337***	0.306**	0.373***	0.347**	0.482***	CONSTANT	0.64***
CONSTANT	(0.1160)	(0.1254)	(0.1215)	(0.1540)	(0.1460)		(0.2013)
Log. L	\(-\)357.94	\(-\)357.73	\(-\)357.4877	\(-\)357.41	\(-\)356.31	Log. L	\(-\)352.53
\(R^2\)	0.0364	0.037	0.0377	0.0379	0.0408	\(R\hat{2}\)	0.051

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***\(p<.01\), **\(p<.05\), and *\(p<.10\). \(N=557\). Dependent variable is subjects’ rejection decision (1 if reject; 0 if accept)