Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis

  • Jakob de Haan
  • Christina Bodea
  • Raymond Hicks
  • Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Article

Abstract

This paper discusses whether central bank independence (CBI) has changed since the financial crisis. Central banks’ quasi-fiscal policies during and after the crisis, and macro-prudential and unconventional monetary policies, which are more redistributive than traditional monetary policy, have led to questions about the desirability of CBI. Some even argue that CBI is under threat. However, a survey among central bankers and updates of legal proxies for CBI do not provide strong evidence that CBI has diminished since the financial crisis. The only indication for this is the increase in the turnover rate of central bank governors in advanced countries.

Keywords

Central bank independence Central bank accountability Unconventional monetary policy 

JEL Classification

E58 E52 E42 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of De Nederlandsche Bank. We like to thank Vedran Šošić and participants in the 23rd Dubrovnik Economic Conference for their comments on a previous version and Henk van Kerkhoff for research assistance.

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Copyright information

© Association for Comparative Economic Studies 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jakob de Haan
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Christina Bodea
    • 6
  • Raymond Hicks
    • 7
  • Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.University of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.De Nederlandsche BankAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.CESifoMunichGermany
  4. 4.Tilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  5. 5.CEPRLondonUK
  6. 6.Michigan State UniversityEast LansingUSA
  7. 7.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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