Foot voting versus ballot box voting: why voting with your feet is crucial to political freedom
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Abstract
Ballot box voting is the main mechanism of political choice in modern liberal democracies. It is also often thought of as the essence of political freedom. Traditional voting has significant virtues. But as a mechanism for exercising political freedom, ballot box voting has serious flaws. The average citizen has almost no chance of affecting the outcome of an electoral process. In part as a result, he or she also has strong incentives to make ill-informed and illogical decisions. “Voting with your feet” is a superior option on both fronts. It is thereby often a superior mechanism of political freedom.
Keywords
Democracy Political freedom Political participation Voting Voting with your feetReferences
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© European Consortium for Political Research 2019