, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 49–64 | Cite as

Subjectivity without physicality: machine, body and the signifying automaton

  • Katerina KolozovaEmail author
Original Article


The concept of the subject relies on humanist presuppositions. Regardless of whether purported to be decentred and posthumanist, the subject conceived in poststructuralist and philosophical terms remains anthropocentric and anthropomorphic. There is something irrecuperably Cartesian in the poststructuralist idea of the subject. Physicality, both bodily and that of the materiality of the machinic prosthesis, is barred from the constitution of the Self, as the real is barred but also foreclosed to it. The subject, therefore, is yet another philosophical phantasm, which in its material actuality is determined as an instance of the signifying automaton. I argue that the “posthumanist” self, if conceived in Marxian and non-philosophical terms, ought to be viewed as the radical dyad of the signifying automaton and the real. It renders Haraway’s notion of the Cyborg more radical and unravels its inhumanity rather than posthumanity.


Feminism Automaton Physicality Non-human Marxism Non-philosophy 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Limited 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social Sciences and HumanitiesSkopjeMacedonia
  2. 2.University American College-SkopjeSkopjeMacedonia

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