Trans-Tasman cooperation in banking supervision and resolution

  • Dirk SchoenmakerEmail author
Original Article


Four major Australian banks span the Australian and New Zealand banking system. Applying the financial trilemma model, this article investigates possible approaches for cooperation in the supervision and resolution of these cross-border banks. The article first reviews the current arrangement in the Trans-Tasman Council of Banking Supervision, which is based on a soft law approach. Next, this article explores a trans-Tasman banking union, which would encompass joint supervision and joint resolution based on burden sharing. The challenge is political. Are the two countries willing to join forces in banking policies and thus give up part of their sovereignty in this field? And can New Zealand, as the smaller one of the two, ensure an effective voice in joint arrangements?


Cross-border banking Financial stability Regional cooperation Trans-Tasman banking 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Limited 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rotterdam School of ManagementErasmus UniversityRotterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR)LondonUK

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