Abstract
The notion of Bayes–Nash equilibrium in a game with point hierarchy of mutual beliefs of players about an uncertain parameter was introduced. Finiteness of the depth of the game information structure was shown to play the key role: conditions were presented under which any action in the two-person game is equilibrium if the depth is infinite.
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Chkhartishvili, A.G. Bayes–Nash Equilibrium: Infinite-Depth Point Information Structures. Automation and Remote Control 64, 1922–1927 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:AURC.0000008430.60568.b0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:AURC.0000008430.60568.b0