Abstract
A model for a hierarchical system in which the principal has aggregated information on the actions of a lower-level agent is designed. The stability of computation of the maximal guaranteed result for the principal is studied.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Aliev, V.S. and Kononenko, A.F., Collective Decision Making from Aggregated Information, Tes. dokl. Vsesoyuz. sov. po statist. diskret. analizu nechislovoi informatsii, ekspertnym otsenkam i diskretnoi optimizatsii, Moscow, 1981, pp. 324, 325.
Germeier, Yu.B., Igry s neprotivopolozhnymi interesami (Games with Nonantagonistic Interests), Moscow: Nauka, 1976.
Tikhonov, A.N. and Arsenin, V.Ya., Metody resheniya nekorrektnykh zadach (Solutions of Ill-defined Problems), Moscow: Nauka, 1986.
Molodtsov, D.A., Ustoichivost' printsipov optimal'nosti (Stability of Optimality Principles), Moscow: Nauka, 1987.
Kukushkin, N.S. and Morozov, V.V., Teoriya neantagonisticheskikh igr (Theory of Nonantagonistic Games), Moscow: Mosk. Gos. Univ., 1984.
Kuratowsky, K., Topology, New York: Academic, 1966, vol. 1. Translated under the title Topol ogi ya, Moscow: Mir, 1966, vol. 1.
Gorelov, M.A., Design of Rational Procedures for Information Exchange in a Two-Player Hierarchical Game: A Parametric Formulation, Avtom. Telemekh., 2003, no. 9, pp. 103–112.
Gorelov, M.A., Design of Rational Procedures for Information Exchange in a Two-Player Hierarchical Game: A Set-Theoretic Formulation, Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz., 2002, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 376–387.
Kononenko, A.F., Mathematical Methods of Analysis of Dynamic Hierarchical Systems, Doctoral Dissertation, Moscow, 1978.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gorelov, M.A. Linear Aggregation of Information in Hierarchical Games. Automation and Remote Control 65, 1808–1816 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:AURC.0000047895.85890.c1
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:AURC.0000047895.85890.c1