Journal of Financial Services Research

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 63–84 | Cite as

Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?

  • Xavier Freixas
  • Curzio Giannini
  • Glenn Hoggarth
  • Farouk Soussa


The maintenance of financial stability is facilitated by well-designed “safety-net” arrangements aimed at limiting the risk of disruption in the financial system (crisis prevention) and the consequences of disruption if it arises (crisis management). An important element of crisis management is the lender of last resort (LOLR) function. This article reviews the main ideas on LOLR reflected in the academic literature, going back to Henry Thornton almost 200 years ago.

lender of last resort systemic risk contagion liquidity bank's rescue 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Freixas
    • 1
  • Curzio Giannini
    • 2
  • Glenn Hoggarth
    • 3
  • Farouk Soussa
    • 3
  1. 1.Pompeu Fabra UniversityBarcelona
  2. 2.International Relations DepartmentBanca d'ItaliaItaly
  3. 3.Regulatory Policy DivisionBank of EnglandGreat Britain

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