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Public Choice

, Volume 107, Issue 1–2, pp 87–96 | Cite as

Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?

  • Mehmet Bac
Article

Abstract

A higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders' information about the identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance incentives to establish “connections” for corruption. The connections effect may dominate the detection effect for local improvement in transparency and generate an increase in corruption, a prediction sharply in contrast with standard theories of transparency.

Keywords

Decision Maker Expected Payoff Nash Bargaining Solution Total Surplus Political Corruption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Bac, M. (1996). Corruption and supervision costs in hierarchies. Journal of Comparative Economics 22: 99-118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bac, M. (1998). The scope, timing and type of corruption. International Review of Law and Economics 12: 101-120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bac, M. and Bag, P.K. (1999). Cost-effective control of corruption in public offices. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
  4. Gardiner, J.A. and Lyman T.R. (1990). The logic of corruption control. In A. Heidenheimer et al. (Eds), Political corruption: A handbook, 827-840. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
  5. Heidenheimer, A.J. (1970). Political corruption. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc.Google Scholar
  6. Klitgaard, R. (1998). Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  7. Woodhouse, D. (1997). In pursuit of good administration. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mehmet Bac
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBilkent UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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