Abstract
A new concept of the characteristic function is defined. It matches cooperative games far better than the classical characteristic function and is useful in reducing the number of decisions that can be used as the unique solution of a game.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953. Translated under the title Teoriya igr i ekonomicheskoe povedenie, Moscow: Nauka, 1970.
Shapley, L.S., A Value for n-Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games.II. Kuhn, H.W. and Tucker, A.W., Eds., Ann. Math. Study, 28, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953, pp. 307–317.
Smol'yakov, E.R., The Concept of a Solution to an iN-Person Coalition Game under Transferability, Dokl.Akad.Nauk SSSR, 1973, vol. 210, no. 6, pp. 1290–1292.
Smol'yakov, E.R., Ravnovesnye modeli pri nesovpadayushchikh interesakh uchastnikov (Equilibrium Models for Dissonant Interests of Participants), Moscow: Nauka, 1986.
Lucas, W.F., A Game with No Solution, The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-5518, Santa Monica, 1967.
Luce, R.D. and Raifa, H., Games and Decisions, London: McGraw-Hill, 1957. Translated under the title Igry i resheniya, Moscow: Inostrannaya Literatura, 1961.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Smol'yakov, E.R. Solutions for Cooperative Games. Automation and Remote Control 63, 1155–1162 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016167116947
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016167116947