Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Strong Active Solution in Non-Cooperative Games

  • Published:
Automation and Remote Control Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

For the non-cooperative games and the problems of accepting or rejecting a proposal, a new notion of equilibrium was proposed, its place among the known basic equilibria was established, and its application to the static and dynamic game problems was demonstrated.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  1. Nash, J., Non-Cooperative Games, Ann. Math., 1951, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 286–295.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Smol'yakov, E.R., Ravnovesnye modeli pri nesovpadayushchikh interesakh uchastnikov (Equilibrium Models for the Noncoinciding Interests of the Participants), Moscow: Nauka, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Smol'yakov, E.R., Teoriya antagonizmov i differentsial'nye igry (Theory of Antagonisms and the Differential Games), Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Smol'yakov, E.R., Methods of Seeking all Kinds of Solutions in the Antagonistic Differential Games with Dependent Strategies, Diff. Uravn., 1998, vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 1337–1345.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Evtushenko, Yu.G. and Smol'yakov, E.R., A New Concept of Solution for the Problems of Accepting Proposals and Coalition-Free Games, Dokl. Ross. Akad. Nauk, 1998, vol. 363, no. 2, pp. 175–177.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Smol'yakov, E.R., Equilibria for Non-Cooperative Differential Games, Diff. Uravn., 1999, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 686–691.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Smol'yakov, E.R., Extension of the Classic Coalition-Free Equilibrium and Progressive Differential Games, Kibern. Sist. Anal., 2000, no. 4, pp. 105–115.

  8. Smol'yakov, E.R., Basic System of Equilibria for the Non-Cooperative Games, Dokl. Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2001, vol. 378, no. 4, pp. 459–462.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Smol'yakov, E.R., Existence of an Infinite System of Notions of the Non-Cooperative Equilibrium, Dokl. Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2000, vol. 374, no. 2, pp. 173–176.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Smol'yakov, E.R., Constructing a Countable System of Notions of the Coalition-Free Equilibrium, Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz., 2001, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 570–576.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Smol'yakov, E.R., Search of the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in the Coalition-Free Games, Diff. Uravn., 2000, vol. 36, no. 12, pp. 1658–1664.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Warga, J., Optimal Control of Differential and Functional Equations, New York: Academic, 1972. Translated under the title Optimal'noe upravlenie differentsial'nymi i funktsional'nymi uravneniyami, Moscow: Nauka, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Smol'yakov, E.R., Existence Theorems for the Symmetrical Active Equilibria in the Non-Cooperative Progressive Differential Games, Diff. Uravn., 1997, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 776–781.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Smol'yakov, E.R., Strong Equilibrium for the Non-Cooperative Games, Dokl. Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2001, vol. 380, no. 5, pp. 603–606.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Systems Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    E. R. Smol'yakov

Authors
  1. E. R. Smol'yakov
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Smol'yakov, E.R. Strong Active Solution in Non-Cooperative Games. Automation and Remote Control 63, 898–905 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016113605135

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016113605135

Keywords

Search

Navigation