Abstract
For the one-agent active system with internal uncertainty and asymmetric information, the incentive problem regarded as the exchange scheme was solved using the principle of open control, that is, constructing an incentive mechanism with revelation of information, where revelation of the true parameters of income function is the dominant agent's strategy.
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Korgin, N.A. Incentive Problems and Exchange Schemes. Automation and Remote Control 62, 1673–1679 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012466517110
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012466517110