Coordination of Interests in the Matrix Control Structures
The problems of incentive that are characteristic of the matrix control structures of the organizational systems were considered. For the two-level active system with distributed supervision, the set of Nash-equilibria was established. To study coalitional interactions, the characteristic function was constructed, and the conditions for realizability of the coalition of all elements of the middle control level were investigated. The problem of coordinating the interests of different hierarchical levels by “internal taxation” of the middle control level was stated and solved.
KeywordsMechanical Engineer Characteristic Function System Theory Organizational System Active System
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