Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 171–190 | Cite as

Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory

  • Stephen Morris
  • Hyun Song Shin
Article

Abstract

The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.

We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.

Common knowledge common belief coordination game theory protocols language 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen Morris
    • 1
  • Hyun Song Shin
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaU.S.A.
  2. 2.Nuffield CollegeOxfordU.K.

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