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The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: Baka v. Hungary and the Rule of Law

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Abstract

The rise of abusive constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has hit the domestic judiciaries particularly hard. Viktor Orbán expanded the size of the Constitutional Court and then packed it, made sure that he can install a new president of the Constitutional Court, ousted the Supreme Court president through a constitutional amendment, disempowered the existing judicial council and created the new institution with power over ordinary judicial appointments. Jaroslav Kaczyński followed the same playbook in Poland. While most scholars have focused primarily on effects of abusive constitutionalism upon the constitutional courts, we argue that the keys to the long-term control of the judiciary are presidents of ordinary courts and judicial councils . The dismissal of the Hungarian Supreme Court President is a perfect example of this logic—by this move Orbán got rid of the most important court president in the country, the head of the Hungarian judicial council and his most vocal critic. Yet, András Baka lodged an application to the ECtHR and won. This article analyses the Grand Chamber judgment in Baka v. Hungary, its implication for the rule of law, and the limits of what the ECtHR can achieve against abusive constitutionalism. It concludes that the Grand Chamber failed on all key fronts. It overlooked the main structural problem behind Mr. Baka’s dismissal (the broad powers of court presidents in CEE), it has blurred the Convention’s understanding of the concept of the rule of law, and it failed in delivering a persuasive judgment firmly based on the existing ECtHR’s case law .

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Notes

  1. See Halmai (2012), p. 367, Landau (2013), p. 208–211, Tushnet (2015), pp. 433-435, Uitz (2015).

  2. Gyulavári and Hős (2013) p. 290. See also Belavusau (2013) p. 1145.

  3. Kosař (2016), p.134.

  4. See Vincze (2015), pp. 445–456; and the literature cited in note 1.

  5. ECtHR, 23 June 2016, Baka v Hungary, no. 20261/12.

  6. See also the earlier Grand Chamber judgments concerning the parliamentary immunity of the members of political opposition: ECtHR, 17 May 2016, Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], no. 42461/13 and 44357/13.

  7. We are aware of the fact that similar terms such as “authoritarian constitutionalism”, “illiberal states”, “hybrid regimes” and “simulated democracies” have been used to portray this phenomenon (see in particular note 1 above). For the sake of simplification, we will treat them as synonyms in this article.

  8. See e.g. Garlicki (2016), Koncewicz (2016), and Koncewicz (2017).

  9. See Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 73.

  10. This case (Denisov v. Ukraine, no. 76639/11) is pending before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR.

  11. See Part 4.

  12. See note 1 above.

  13. Sólyom (2015), p. 5.

  14. Chronowski and Varju (2016), p. 271.

  15. Magone (2010), p. 456.

  16. See several infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission in 2012, e.g. European Commission (2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-24_en.htm?locale=en, accessed on 3 May 2017.

  17. For the discussion of further measures, see Marthoz (2012) or Scheppele (2012b).

  18. See e.g. Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision no 6/2011 or Decision no 12/2013.

  19. Chronowski and Varju (2016), p. 282. For criticism of the reform as undermining the democratic system of checks and balances, see also Venice Commission, Opinion No 720/2013.

  20. Sonnevend, Jakab and Csink (2015), p. 90.

  21. Rupnik (2012), p. 134.

  22. Sólyom (1994) and Sólyom (2003).

  23. See Article 24- of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011). See also Halmai (2012), p. 369; and Landau (2013), p. 209–210.

  24. Act LXVII on the legal status and remuneration of judges.

  25. Scheppele (2015), p. 111.

  26. Gyulavári and Hős (2013), p. 290.

  27. Ibid.

  28. We are grateful for this insight to Gábor Halmai.

  29. Note that appointment of judges in Hungary (with the exception of the Supreme Court judges) is controlled by the President of the newly established National Office for the Judiciary. See note 37 below.

  30. European Commission for Democracy through law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the legal status and the remuneration of judges, and on Act CLXI of 2011 on the organization and administration of the courts in Hungary, Opinion No. 663/2012, 19 March 2012, para. 106.

  31. CJEU, Commission v Hungary, 6 November 2012, C-286/12.

  32. Judgment No. 6/2011.

  33. CJEU, Commission v. Hungary, C-286/12.

  34. Von Bogdandy, Antpöhler, Dickschen, Hentrei, Kottmann and Smrkolj (2015), p. 235-256.

  35. Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organization and Administration of the Courts, 1 January 2011.

  36. Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges, 1 March 2011.

  37. See note 35, Art. 76(5). Some of the competences of the NOJ eventually changed due to the Venice Commission criticism. Yet, the changes were still considered unsatisfactory. See Transparency International (2013), The Government reacts with pretence solutions, available at (https://transparency.hu/en/news/tovabbra-sem-garantalt-az-igazsagszolgaltatas-fuggetlensege/).

  38. Venice Commission 2011 (CDL-AD(2011)016).

  39. See Bobek and Kosař (2014): pp. 1271–1272; Kosař (2016): 401; and Kosař (2017): pp. 114–122 (who claim that it is critical to ban the simultaneous exercise of the office of the Supreme Court President and the chairmanship of the judicial council, since such accumulation of power increases the incentives to install the loyal person to this position as well as the likelihood of the abuse of these powers).

  40. See notes 26-28 above.

  41. See note 29 above.

  42. Note that prior to his appointment as the President of the Hungarian Supreme Court Mr. Baka, among other things, served as a judge at the ECtHR for 17 years.

  43. Decision of the Hungarian Parliament No. 55/2009.

  44. Press release of the Supreme Court President’s spokesman of 12 February 2011.

  45. Scheppele (2012a).

  46. Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 166/2011(xII.20.)AB of 19 December 2011.

  47. Baka, A (2011) Speech. 3 November 2011.

  48. Act No. CLXI, Article 16.

  49. See ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], para. 25..

  50. Position of the Government of Hungary on the Opinion on the Fundamental Law of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session. 17-18 June 2011, Cdl-AD(2011)016).

  51. ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], para. 28.

  52. Ibid, para.29.

  53. Ibid, para. 30.

  54. Note that this constitutional amendment was adopted only on 29 November 2011 and came into force on 2 December 2011, that is few days before the election of the new Supreme Court President.

  55. Ibid, para. 35.

  56. Halmai (2017), pp. 471-488.

  57. As the ECtHR did not address the other articles invoked by Mr. Baka on the merits, we will leave them aside here.

  58. Due to limited space, we focus exclusively on the 2016 Grand Chamber judgment and leave aside the earlier chamber judgment (see ECtHR, Baka v Hungary, 27 May 2014).

  59. ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], paras. 103-106.

  60. ECtHR, Vilho Eskelinen and Others judgment ([GC], no. 63235/00, para. 62.

  61. ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], para. 114.

  62. Ibid, para. 115.

  63. Ibid, para. 116 (emphasis added).

  64. Ibid, para. 116.

  65. Ibid, para. 117 (citations omitted).

  66. Ibid, para. 121.

  67. Ibid, para. 121.

  68. Ibid, paras. 140–142.

  69. The existence of interference is rarely disputed in the ECtHR judgments concerning freedom of expression. Most Article 10 cases are decided in the final stage of the Article 10 test, that is, on whether the impugned interference was “necessary in democratic society”.

  70. ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], paras. 143–152.

  71. Ibid, para. 148.

  72. Ibid, para. 150.

  73. Ibid, para. 154.

  74. Ibid, para. 156.

  75. Ibid, para. 165 (citations omitted).

  76. Ibid, para. 168.

  77. Ibid, para. 171.

  78. Ibid, para. 170.

  79. Ibid, para. 171.

  80. Ibid, para. 171.

  81. Ibid, para. 173.

  82. For a similar observation in another recent Grand Chamber judgment against Hungary, see para. 45 of Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Nußberger, Hirvelä, Bianku, Yudkivska, Møse, Lemmens and O’Leary in ECtHR, 13 December 2016, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12.

  83. For a similar conclusion, see Vincze (2015), pp. 451-453.

  84. See Part 4 and 5.

  85. See part 5 and Kosař (2012), pp. 37–39.

  86. Even though we agree that some individual human rights have a structural character; see Varol (2017).

  87. A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act that singles out an individual or group for punishment without a trial. See e.g. Article I, Section 9, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the United States.

  88. On the principle of generality, see e.g. Tamanaha (2004), pp. 93–94; Kramer (2007), pp. 109–113 and 144–150; and Raz (2009), pp. 215–216.

  89. See Joint concurring opinion of judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov, para. 15.

  90. See note 60.

  91. See in particular ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], paras. 121 and 172.

  92. Ibid, paras. 114, 121, 168 and 172.

  93. For the confirmation of this view, see Joint concurring opinion of judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov, para. 11.

  94. We will revisit some of those issues in more detail in Part 4.

  95. ECtHR, Baka v Hungary [GC], para. 169.

  96. Dijkstra (2017).

  97. For instance, French judges are extremely reluctant to speak extrajudicially, which is an inherent feature of the French legal culture.

  98. Recall how careful Irish judges were in going public regarding the referendum on reducing judicial salaries (see Mac Cormaic (2016)); and how much controversy the Chief Justice of Canadian Supreme Court, Beverley McLachlin, stirred when she wanted to question in a private talk (sic!) the constitutionality of appointment of Justice Nadon by the Harper Government to the Canadian Supreme Court (see e.g. Aaron Wherry, Stephen Harper, Beverley McLachlin and an historic mess, Maclean’s, May 6, 2014, available at http://www.macleans.ca/politics/stephen-harper-beverley-mclachlin-and-historic-mess/).

  99. See Kudeshkina v Russia, 26 February 2009, no. 29492/05, paras. 93-95; and Di Giovanni v. Italy, no. 51160/06, 9 July 2013, paras. 71 and 75-86. See also Mahoney (2012), p. 258.

  100. Baka v Hungary [GC], para. 114, 121, 168 and 172.

  101. See Kosař and Lixinski (2015); and, more broadly, Bobek and Kosař (2014). Cf. Joint concurring opinion of judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov, para. 11.

  102. The motivations of politicians and their techniques vary from replacing a vocal critic among court presidents and rigged case assignment to silencing critics among rank-and-file judges by initiating unsubstantiated disciplinary motions (by loyal court presidents) against them.

  103. See ECtHR, 5 February 2009, Olujić v. Croatia, no. 22330/05. For a broader political context of this dispute, see Uzelac (2001), pp. 45–51.

  104. Kosař (2016), pp. 289–290; and Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers on His Mission to the Slovak Republic (November 27–29, 2000), E/CN.4/2001/65/Add.3, paras 27–33.

  105. See Bobek (2010), pp. 263–265; Kosař (2017), pp. 107–108.

  106. As a result, she was reinstated to the position of Supreme Court President and thus this case never reached the Strasbourg Court.

  107. See Garlicki (2016); Koncewicz (2016), in particular at pp. 1756, 1759–1763; and Koncewicz (2017).

  108. See Uzelac (2001), pp. 45–51 (regarding Krunoslav Olujić); and Kosař (2016), pp. 236–333 and 355–361 (regarding Štefan Harabin).

  109. See Piana (2010), pp. 43–44; Popova (2012), pp. 135–145; and Kosař (2016), pp. 390–395.

  110. See Schwartz and Sykiainen (2012), pp. 995–996, 1003, 1008–1009, 1012, 1018–1027 and 1031–1034; and Kosař (2017), pp. 115–116.

  111. Solomon (2010), p. 354. See also Popova (2012), pp. 136–137.

  112. Kosař (2016), p. 390.

  113. Uzelac (2001), p. 43.

  114. Solomon (2010), p. 354.

  115. See Müller (2012), p. 965.

  116. At the moment of their dismissals, apart from being Supreme Court presidents Mr. Baka was a chairman of the Hungarian National Judicial Council and Mr. Olujic was a crucial member of the Croatian Judicial Council.

  117. See Seibert-Fohr (2012), pp. 481–483 (on Germany); and Garapon and Epineuse (2012), pp. 285–286 (on France). In general, see Solomon (2012), pp. 918 and 920–921. In some countries such as the Netherlands, court presidents still enjoy considerable powers, but they are constrained by conventions and also by a conceptualization and internalization of judicial independence applicable to their role.

  118. Bröstl (2003), pp. 141, 143. See also Frankowski (1991), pp. 40–47; Markovits (1996), pp. 2292–2293; and Wagnerová (2003), p.167.

  119. See e.g. the techniques used by the President of the Slovak Supreme Court, Štefan Harabin, between 2009 and 2014, described in Kosař (2016), pp. 236–333 and 355–361.

  120. Democracy Reporting International: In Need of New Tools: Protecting Democracy in EU Member States (www.democracy.reporting.org).

  121. E.g. European Commission, ‘Follow up to the European Parliament resolution on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012), adopted by the Commission’, 8 October 2013, SP(2013)627; European Parliament, ‘Situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012)’, 2013/2078(INI), see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2078(INI).

  122. Certain clarification of the rule of law requirements now appears in the 2016 Venice Commission check-list, The Venice Commission check-list identifies the core elements of the rule of law as legality (i.e. transparent, accountable and democratic legislative process), legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness, access to justice before independent and impartial courts, respect for human rights, and no-discrimination and equality before the law. See Venice Commission (2016). For more see also Dimitry Kochenov (2008), The EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (Kluwer Law International).

  123. Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008).

  124. Vincze (2015).

  125. Lautenbach (2013), p. 1.

  126. Kosař and Lixinski (2015).

  127. Káracsony and Others v Hungary (2006), app. no. 37494/02.

  128. ECtHR, Golder v the United Kingdom (1975), app. no. 4451/70. See also Greer (2006), p. 196.

  129. Černič (2016).

  130. ECtHR, Gillan and Quinton v UK (2010), App. no. 4185/05, para. 77.

  131. ECtHR [GC] Baka v Hungary.

  132. Ibid, para. 117.

  133. Ibid, para. 117 in fine.

  134. See Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], No. 28396/95, 28 Oct. 1999, paras 42–43 (where the “smoking gun” was the a letter of the Prince of Lichtenstein on heraldic paper in which the Prince clearly expressed that he considered the views of Mr. Wille presented in Wille’s public lecture ‘incredibly arrogant’ and in his eyes the attitude of Dr Wille made him unsuitable for public office).

  135. For a similar conclusion see Vincze (2015): pp. 452–453.

  136. See ECtHR [GC] Baka v Hungary, paras 143–148.

  137. This assessment is not as simple as the Grand Chamber pretends. See e.g. the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States on the Bill of Attainder: American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Other supreme and constitutional courts have similarly complex jurisprudence.

  138. In other words, the Hungarian Supreme Court President was a “class of one” and hence it did not make sense to draft the relevant provision generally. See e.g. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).

  139. Uitz R (2017) Academic Freedom in an Illiberal Democracy: From Rule of Law through Rule by Law to Rule by Men in Hungary. 13 October 2017, Verfassungsblog (http://verfassungsblog.de/academic-freedom-in-an-illiberal-democracy-from-rule-of-law-through-rule-by-law-to-rule-by-men-in-hungary/), accessed 17 October 2017.

  140. See ECtHR [GC] Baka v Hungary, para. 127.

  141. Ibid, para. 121 and 154.

  142. See e.g. Judge Sicilianos who noted that “the rule of law is hardly imaginable without an obligation on the State to offer safeguards for the protection of judicial independence…”

  143. See note 9, para. 189, 208.

  144. The Erményi v. Hungary case discussed in Part 5.2 attests to it.

  145. See Part 4 of this article.

  146. For an elaboration on the role of the ECtHR in protecting the common standards and minimum level of compliance see Føllesdal (2016).

  147. See Tamanaha (2004).

  148. Czarnota (2016), p. 318; Přibáň (2009).

  149. For the distinction between the “thick” and “thin” conceptions of the rule of law see Tamanaha (2004), pp. 91-113; Møller & Skaaning (2012); and Krygier (2016), pp. 213-215.

  150. See Waldron (2002).

  151. See Craig (1997), Waldron 2008 and Taekema 2013.

  152. For a similar call, see Krygier (2016), pp. 222-223.

  153. Lautenbach (2013), p. 174.

  154. Ibid, p. 194.

  155. Lautenbach (2013).

  156. See Klass and others v Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, para. 55, Rotaru v Romania, judgment of the Grant Chamber of 4 May 2000, para. 59, or Volokhy v Ukraine, judgment of 2 November 2006, paras. 52-54.

  157. Schöpfer v Switzerland, App no 25405/94, ECHR 1998-III, 20 May 1998, paras. 29–30; Nikula v Finland, App no 31611/96, ECHR 2002-II, 21 March 2002, para. 45; Stere and ors v Romania, 23 February 2006, at 53.

  158. Stafford v United Kingdom (GC), App no 46295/99, ECHR 2002-IV, 28 May 2002, at 78,

  159. Lautenbach (2013), p. 157; and Kosař (2012).

  160. Kosař and Lixinski (2015).

  161. For a potentially helpful theoretical support for this position, see Raz (1979), Waldron (2013), Waldron (2014) and Varol (2017).

  162. For the discussion of the resulting repercussions see Kosař and Lixinski (2015).

  163. ECtHR, Erményi v Hungary, judgment of 22 November 2016, app. no. 22254/14.

  164. Ibid, Dissenting opinion of judge Kuris, para. 15.

  165. In contrast to Mr. Baka who was obliged to comment on laws related to judiciary as a chairman of NJC, Mr. Erményi had no role in the NJC.

  166. Hungarian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 3076/2013, (III. 27.) AB, 13 March 2013.

  167. One may claim that Erményi simply follows Volkov and Özpınar in this respect (see Erményi v Hungary, para. 30). However, both Mr. Volkov and Mrs. Özpınar were dismissed from the judicial office, i.e. they lossed their job and income, which affected their relationships with other persons, their reputation and their "inner circle". But Mr. Erményi remained a judge of the Supreme Court with a decent salary (i.e. the loss of his income was marginal) and to claim that the status of a “supreme court vice-president" is so critical for one's reputation that it spills over into his private life is quite a stretch. The Erményi judgment thus does not follow Volkov and Özpınar, but expands them..

  168. See Part 4.

  169. See Part 5.1.

  170. For instance, the ECtHR could have done so through the second Eskelinen criterion under Article 6 ECHR in Baka (see Part 3.2 of this article).

  171. The latter is arguably what the Court of Justice of the European Union did in Commission v Hungary, 6 November 2012, C-286/12. See notes 2, 31 and 33 above.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Matej Avbelj, Jernej Letnar Černič, Petra Gyongyi, Gábor Halmai, participants of the Ljubljana conference in December 2016, and members of JUSTIN for their suggestions and comments, which significantly improved the original manuscript. The research leading to this article has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant no. 678375- JUDI-ARCH-ERC-2015-STG).

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  1. Judicial Studies Institute (JUSTIN), Faculty of Law, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

    David Kosař & Katarína Šipulová

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  1. David Kosař
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  2. Katarína Šipulová
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Correspondence to Katarína Šipulová.

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The article is a part of the Special Issue of the 2016 Ljubljana conference. The research leading to this article has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant no. 678375- JUDI-ARCH-ERC-2015-STG).

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Kosař, D., Šipulová, K. The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: Baka v. Hungary and the Rule of Law. Hague J Rule Law 10, 83–110 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-017-0065-y

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