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Reset and Go: The Unitary Patent System Post-Brexit

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Abstract

Patent law in Europe is characterized by a historic rivalry between EU and non-EU patent systems. The EU for decades could not establish a working, attractive and balanced system of its own. After the failure of its well-tailored 2009 model, the Commission was determined to push ahead with the patent plans even at the cost of compromise that severely damaged the functionality of the patent system. The result was the 2012 Unitary Patent Package, which has since been cleared twice by the CJEU in spite of severe doubts concerning EU law compatibility. Just as the race seemed to near finish line, the June 2016 Brexit referendum put a spoke in the EU’s wheel. Against the backdrop of a brief review of the systemic rivalry, this paper recounts and assesses the CJEU’s recent case law on the legality of the UP Package, the implications of the Brexit vote and the prospects, if any, for the unitary patent post-Brexit.

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Notes

  1. For more, see e.g. F. Dehousse, The Unified Court on Patents: The New Oxymoron of European Law, Egmont Paper 60 (2013), p. 5 et seq.; Plomer (2015), pp. 508, 510 et seq.

  2. For more detail, see Jaeger (2010), p 63 et seq.

  3. Draft Agreements of 2003 and 2005, on 12 October 2016 available at http://legaltexts.arcdev.hu/law-practice/legislative-initiatives/epla.html; for more, see Pagenberg (2006), p. 46, passim.

  4. See Proposal for a Council Reg. on the Community patent, COM (2000), p. 412; for more K.-H. Lehne, Patent Initiative for a New European Patent Law, GRUR Int. 2006, p. 363, passim.

  5. See Reg. (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Council Reg. (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and Commission Reg. (EC) No 2868/95 implementing Council Reg. (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, and repealing Commission Reg. (EC) No 2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, [2015] OJ L 341/21; Council Reg. (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, [2002] OJ L 3/1.

  6. [1976] OJ L 17/1.

  7. [1989] OJ L 401/1.

  8. See supra note. 3.

  9. Proposal for a Revised Council Reg. on the Community patent, Council Doc. No. 7119/04.

  10. European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council Reg. on the Community patent, P5_TA(2002)0163.

  11. For more, see Jaeger et al. (2009), pp. 817, 819.

  12. Proposal for a Council Reg. on the Community patent, Council Doc. No. 16113/09; for more, see Jaeger, CML Rev. 2010 (supra note 2), p. 79 et seq.

  13. See Opinion 1/09, European and Community Patents Court, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123.

  14. Cf. Commission Press Release of 4 December 2009, IP/09/1880.

  15. For more, see Jaeger (2012), pp. 286 et seq.

  16. Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of UP protection, [2011] OJ L 76/53; for more, see Lamping (2011), pp. 879 et seq.

  17. [2012] OJ L 361/1.

  18. [2012] OJ L 361/89.

  19. [2012] OJ C 175/1.

  20. Rec. 3 et seq. Decision 2011/167/EU (supra note 16).

  21. Rec. 8 Decision 2011/167/EU (supra note 16).

  22. Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240.

  23. Spain and Italy v. Council (supra note 22), paras. 20 et seq.

  24. Cf. Art. 2(6) TFEU.

  25. Spain and Italy v. Council (supra note 22), paras. 53 et seq.

  26. Cf. also Art. 36 TFEU.

  27. Case C-146/13, Spain v. European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:298; Case C-147/13, Spain v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:299.

  28. See at supra notes 16 and 17; for more Greaney (2015), p. 111, passim; critical Jaeger (2013a), p. 389, passim; R.M. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping and H. Ullrich, The UP Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-12, 1 et seq.

  29. See at supra note 18; for more, see Baldan and van Zimmeren (2015), p. 1529, passim; critical Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping and Ullrich, MPI Research Paper (supra note 28), p. 1 et seq.

  30. See Jaeger (2013b), pp. 15, 17.

  31. Cf. Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 296 et seq; equally Ohly and Streinz (2017), pp. 4 et seq.

  32. See also Jaeger (2013c), pp. 1101 et seq.; more critical Brandi-Dohrn (2012), pp. 372 et seq.

  33. Cf. Jaeger, IIC 2013 (supra note 28), passim; Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), passim; Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping and Ullrich, MPI Research Paper (supra note 28), passim; Jaeger, EuZW 2013 (supra note 30), passim.

  34. Cf. Art. 218(11) TFEU. Note, however, Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), p. 5, who suggest that the CJEU may have cleared the UPC model by an obiter reference in Spain v. European Parliament and Council.

  35. See supra note 25.

  36. Cf. Case 9/56, Meroni, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7.

  37. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 30–32.

  38. Cf. Jaeger, IIC 2013 (supra note 28), pp. 291 and 293 et seq.

  39. Statement of Position by the Advocates General of 2 July 2010 on Opinion 1/09, European and Community Patents Court, not reported in the ECR/ECLI, paras. 70 and 72.

  40. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 69 et seq.

  41. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), para. 74.

  42. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 39 et seq.

  43. Cf. the Trade Mark and Design Regs. (both in supra note 5).

  44. See Art. 258 or 259 TFEU.

  45. See Art. 267 TFEU; cf. Ohly and Streinz (supra note 34).

  46. Cf. W. Tilmann, The Future of the UPC after Brexit, GRUR 2016, p. 753, passim; W. Tilmann, IPKat Blog of 26 June 2016, A possible way for a non-EU UK to participate in the UP and Unified Patent Court?, on 6 October 2016 available at http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.at/2016/06/a-possible-way-for-non-eu-uk-to.html; W. Hoyng, Does Brexit mean the end of the UPC?, on 11 October 2016 available at http://eplaw.org/upc-does-brexit-mean-the-end-of-the-upc/; A. Ohly, Kluwer Patent Blog, UK will not have to accept the supremacy of EU law by separate agreement if it ratifies the Unified Patent Court Agreement, on 29 November 2016 available at http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2016/11/26/ukwill-not-accept-supremacy-eu-law-separateagreement-ratifies-unified-patent-courtagreement/; T. Jaeger, IPKat Blog of 11 July 2016, Is Brexit breaking the UP?, on 6 October 2016 available at http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.at/2016/07/guest-post-is-brexit-breaking-unitary.html; R. Gordon and T. Pascoe, Opinion for the UK IP Federation on the effect of ‘Brexit’on the UP Reg. and the Unified Patent Court Agreement, dated 12 September 2016, on 6 October 2016 available at http://www.eip.com/assets/downloads/gordon-and-pascoe-advice-upca-34448129-1-.pdf; B. Stjerna, UP and court system – squaring the circle after the ‘Brexit’ vote, paper dated 19 September 2016, on 6 October 2016 available at www.stjerna.de/unitary-patent/?lang=en; Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), pp. 1 passim; Ubertazzi (2017), pp. 301 passim.

  47. See at supra note 16.

  48. See Art. 18 Reg. 1257/2012 (supra note 17); Art. 7 Reg. 1260/2012 (supra note 17).

  49. UK IPO Press Release of 28 November 2016, The UK government has confirmed it is proceeding with preparations to ratify the Unified Patent Court Agreement, on 29 November 2016 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-signals-green-light-to-unified-patent-court-agreement.

  50. Cf. PM Speech of 17 January 2017, The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU, on 24 January 2017 available on https://www.gov.uk/.

  51. See Judgment of 24 January 2017, R v. Secretary of State [2017] UKSC 5.

  52. See Tilmann, Ohly, Hoyng and Gordon and Pascoe; Ohly and Streinz, all cited in supra note 46.

  53. See Jaeger, Stjerna and Ubertazzi, all cited in supra note 46.

  54. See already Jaeger (supra note 46), IPKat Blog.

  55. Cf. Art. 48 TEU.

  56. HM Government Cabinet Office, The process for withdrawing from the European Union, February 2016; HM Government Cabinet Office, Alternatives to membership: possible models for the United Kingdom outside the European Union, March 2016; both on 12 October 2016 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications.

  57. On the duration of negotiations, see also House of Lords European Union Committee, The process of withdrawing from the European Union, 11th Report of Session 2015–16, HL Paper 138, 12 et seq.

  58. D. Sarmiento, Despite our Differences Blog of 3 October 2016, Post-Brexit Britain, or how to take back some control by losing all of it, accessed on 6 October 2016 at https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2016/10/03/post-brexit-britain-or-how-to-take-back-some-control-by-losing-all-of-it/.

  59. See at supra note 56.

  60. Reg. (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2012] OJ L 351/1.

  61. Convention of 30 October 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2007] OJ L 339/3.

  62. See supra note 46.

  63. Optimistic Tilmann, Hoyng and Gordon and Pascoe, Ohly and Streinz, skeptical Jaeger, Ubertazzi and Stjerna; all cited in supra note 46.

  64. PM Speech of 17 January 2017 (supra note 50).

  65. Cf. Art. 50 TEU.

  66. See Art. 52 TEU; Art. 355 TFEU.

  67. Cf. also Art. 77 TFEU.

  68. See Art. 6 of Prot. No. 19 to TEU and TFEU.

  69. See Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), paras. 66 et seq.

  70. For more see Jaeger (2013c), p. 559, similarly Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), p. 4.

  71. Cf. Tilmann, Ohly, Hoyng and Gordon and Pascoe, Ohly and Streinz, all cited in supra note 46.

  72. Cf. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 70 and 75.

  73. Cf. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 28 et seq. and 70 et seq.

  74. Also Stjerna (supra note 46), p. 6.

  75. Cf. Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 296 et seq, similarly Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), p. 4.

  76. Cf. Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping and Ullrich, MPI Research Paper (supra note 28), pp. 1 et seq.

  77. Art. 1 UPCA.

  78. Case C-337/95, Dior, ECLI:EU:C:1997:517, paras. 20 et seq.

  79. Case C-196/09, Miles, ECLI:EU:C:2011:388, paras. 40 et seq.

  80. Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), para. 59.

  81. Cf. Tilmann, Ohly and Gordon and Pascoe, Ohly and Streinz, all cited in supra note 46.

  82. See Hoyng (supra note 46), main text and comments.

  83. Equally by Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), paras. 129 et seq.

  84. Hoyng (supra note 46), comment 2; equally Tilmann (supra note 46).

  85. See at supra note 49.

  86. Cf. Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping and Ullrich, MPI Research Paper (supra note 28), p. 6; Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 301 et seq.; Jaeger, System (supra note 32), p. 711 et seq.

  87. For more Jaeger, System (supra note 32), pp. 736 et seq., 778 et seq. and 785 et seq.; Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 301 et seq; Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), p. 7, suggest a competence waiver by way of an EU Regulation.

  88. Tilmann, cited in supra note 46.

  89. Tilmann, IPKat Blog (supra note 46).

  90. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 65.

  91. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 67.

  92. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 68.

  93. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 68.

  94. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 69.

  95. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 70.

  96. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 86.

  97. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), para. 87.

  98. Cf. Stjerna, Brexit (supra note 46), p. 5; Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping and Ullrich, MPI Research Paper (supra note 28), p. 6; Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), pp. 301 et seq.; Jaeger, System (supra note 32), p. 711 et seq.; Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), para. 59.

  99. Tilmann, cited in supra note 46.

  100. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), para. 72.

  101. Cf. Statement of Position for Opinion 1/09 (supra note 39), para. 69.

  102. See at supra note 36.

  103. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 69 et seq.

  104. Cf. Spain v. Parliament and Council (supra note 25), paras. 84 et seq.

  105. Cf. Art. 5(3) Reg. 1257/2012 (supra note 17).

  106. Similarly Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), paras. 48 et seq; Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), p. 8.

  107. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), paras. 62, 74 and 75.

  108. Similarly Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), paras. 71 and 72 et seq.

  109. Opinion 1/09 (supra note 13), paras. 74 to 76.

  110. E.g. Jaeger, System (supra note 32), pp. 603 et seq., 736 et seq. and 830 et seq.; Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 301 et seq.; Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), paras. 72 et seq.

  111. See the EP proposal 2004 for a Common court of appeals (at supra note 10).

  112. See at supra note 9.

  113. Cf. Jaeger, System (supra note 32), pp. 607 et seq. and 612 et seq.

  114. See supra note 8.

  115. Cf. Art. 48(6) TEU.

  116. Cf. Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), para. 97, who call the “CJEU’s reasoning in Opinion 1/09 … undoubtedly … opaque”.

  117. See Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 302.

  118. Cf. Jaeger, System (supra note 32), pp. 736 et seq. and 835 et seq.

  119. Equally Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), para. 103; similarly Ohly and Streinz, 2017 (supra note 31), p. 8.

  120. Equally Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), para. 103.

  121. See at supra note 47.

  122. Cf. Art. 89 UPCA (supra note 19).

  123. See at supra note 49.

  124. See at supra note 51.

  125. See also Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), paras. 129 et seq.

  126. See already Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 286.

  127. Summarized in Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping and Ullrich, MPI Research Paper (supra note 28), passim.

  128. See also Gordon and Pascoe, Opinion (supra note 46), para. 59; already Jaeger, IIC 2012 (supra note 15), p. 299 et seq.

  129. Cf. Jaeger, System (supra note 32), p. 479 et seq.

  130. See at supra note 110.

  131. See at supra note 12.

  132. See at supra note 4.

  133. See 18th Draft of 1 July 2015, on 12 October 2016 available at https://www.unified-patent-court.org/documents.

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  1. Vienna University, Vienna, Austria

    Thomas Jaeger (Professor of European Law)

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Jaeger, T. Reset and Go: The Unitary Patent System Post-Brexit. IIC 48, 254–285 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-017-0569-y

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