In this paper, we first generalize Yang and Ju’s (J Glob Optim 65:563–573, 2016) result in Hausdorff topological vector spaces. Second, we introduce the model of leader-follower games with infinitely many leaders and followers, that is, infinite-leader-infinite-follower game. We next introduce the notion of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games and prove the existence result.
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This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 11501349) and Graduate Innovation Foundation sponsored by Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (No. CXJJ-2017-375).
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Yang, Z., Gong, Q. Existence of Weakly Cooperative Equilibria for Infinite-Leader-Infinite-Follower Games. J. Oper. Res. Soc. China 7, 643–654 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-018-0236-0
- (Weakly) cooperative equilibrium
- Infinite-leader–infinite-follower game
Mathematics Subject Classification