Abstract.
Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own stimuli. When stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions.
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Güth, W., Peleg, B. When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis. J Evol Econ 11, 479–499 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s191-001-8318-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s191-001-8318-2