Abstract
We prove in a dynamic programming framework that uniform convergence of the finite horizon values implies that asymptotically the average accumulated payoff is constant on optimal trajectories. We analyze and discuss several possible extensions to two-person games.
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Sorin, S., Venel, X. & Vigeral, G. Asymptotic properties of optimal trajectories in dynamic programming. Sankhya 72, 237–245 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13171-010-0011-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13171-010-0011-8