Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Corporate criminal liability in the realm of aviation security: the 2010 BEIJING convention in focus

  • Published:
Journal of Transportation Security Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The most important reason for the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1943 is to adopt measures, practices and procedures to secure international civil aviation against unlawful interference. This objective has been the module oparandi of the ICAO in order not to disappoint the international community. Thus, starting from 1963 to date various international instruments on aviation security have been adopted by the international community under the ICAO auspices to secure international civil aviation. The ICAO adopted a new Convention in 2010 to deal with the old and new threat of aviation terrorism. The provision relating to the liability of corporate legal entity is captured for the purpose of prosecuting any corporate legal entity that complicit in any of the act of unlawful interference with civil aviation. This article intends to critically analyse the actual provision of the Convention on the criminal liability of a corporate legal entity, and to determine the reason behind the inclusion of this provision in the Convention. The paper further examines the form of punishments that may be imposed on an erring corporate legal entity for its participation in any unlawful interference with civil aviation. The paper advocates for the imposition of punishment such as dissolution of company, corporate lockup, fine and adverse publicity of corporate wrongdoing as form of punishments against any legal entity for committing any unlawful act.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Aviation Security Conventions include the Tokyo Convention on the Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, adopted in Tokyo on 14th September 1963 and entered into force on 4th December 1963; 704 UNTS 219, 20 U.S.T 2941, T.I.A.S No. 6768. [Herein after referred to as “the Tokyo Convention 1963]; The Hague Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed at Hague on 16 December 1970 and entered into force on 14th October 1971, 80 UTNS 105, 22 U.S.T 1641, T.I.A.S No. 7192. [Herein after referred to as “The Hague Convention, 1970]; and the Montreal Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971, adopted and opened for signature on 23rd September 1971 and entered into force on 26th January 1973; ICAO Doc. 8920/860 UNTS 105, ATS 16/10 ILM 33 (1971).

  2. For the definition of aircraft hijacking, see Hague Convention 1970, art 1, 2010 Beijing Convention On the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010, 50 ILM 144 (2011). [Herein after referred to as ‘The 2010 Beijing Convention’], art 1, and the Nigerian Civil Aviation Act, 2006, s 56.

  3. See Montreal Convention 1971, art 1 and the Nigerian Civil Aviation Act, 2006, s 57 (2).

  4. See International Convention against Hostage-Taking 1971, art 1.

  5. The seizure of four United States of America airlines on 11 September 2001, where the seized aircrafts were used as weapons of mass destruction corroborated this submission.

  6. Ibid at 1437

  7. Khann (1996), Pitt and Groskaufmanis (1990), Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat at 110–126, Weigend (2008).

  8. Khann, note 9, at 1496.

  9. The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating To International Civil Aviation, Sept. 10, 2010 cited as 50 ILM 141 (2011).

  10. International Maritime Organization: Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of which International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary General Reforms Depository or Other Functions 421 (Dec. 2, 2013) <http://www.imo.org/About/conventions/Status%202013 >accessed 12 December 2014.

  11. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 0f December 9, 1999. Reprint by Geoffrey Kieley, Law and Government Division, 19 September 2001.

  12. See SUA, art 5 and Financing of Terrorism Convention, art 5 respectively.

  13. See Hague Convention 1970, art 2 and Montreal Convention, art 1.

  14. See International Civil Aviation Organization, August 30–September 10, 2010: Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security, Proposed Amendments to deal with the Notion of ‘person” under the Montreal Convention (ICAO DCAS Flimsy No.1, Sept.1, 2010).

  15. 2010 Beijing Convention, art 4 (1).

  16. See ICAO DCA Flimsy No.1 at pp.2–3; see also Alejandro, 201.

  17. See SUA, art 5 and Convention on Financing of Terrorism, art5 which provides thus:…shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory….[emphasis added].

  18. Ibid.

  19. Consequences of Aviation terrorism include death, destruction of properties, distortion of international market, psychological disorder of the victims’ relatives and war between the offender and victim states.

  20. See the case of Iyoho v. Effiong [2007] All FWLR {pt. 374} 206. See also Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, 1000.

  21. See Orakul Resources Ltd. v. N.C.C [2007] All FWLR {pt.390} 1489.

  22. Hoover (2011). See also Menthe (1998). For a detail analysis of territorial jurisdiction see Hamid (2011).

  23. Ibid.

  24. Alejandro,note 16, at 200.

  25. ICAO DCAS Flimsy No.1.

  26. Hague Convention 1970, art 3; Montreal Convention, 1971 art 3.

  27. 2010 Beijing Convention, art 3.

  28. Ibid.

  29. Ibid at 1104. See also Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, (New Edn, Longman Group, England, 2000) 974; Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary, (New Edn, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom,2003) 853.

  30. Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary, note 35 at1146.

  31. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, note 35, at1306.

  32. For further discussion see Linus Hussein Ali (2008).

  33. Black’s Law Dictionary, 1178.

  34. See also Royal Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. F.B.N. Ltd. [1997] 6 NWLR [Pt. 510] 584; Afribank (Nig.) Ltd. v. MOSLAD Ent. Ltd. [2008] All FWLR [Pt. 877] 893. Khann, at 1485–1486.

  35. For example Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004, s.18 (2); Companies and allied Matters Act, Cap C20 LFN 2004, s 408 (e); Insurance Act, 2004, ss 32, 37 and 46(1); and Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial malpractices in Banks Act, 2004, s 22 (2).

  36. Montenegro Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Entity Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Montengro Nos.2/2007 and 13/2007 which provides for dissolution of legal entity as sanction against erring company. See art13 (2) and (3).

  37. Serbia Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Entity Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No 97/08 of 27 October 2008 which provides for termination of the status of a legal entity as sanction against erring company. See art13 (2).

  38. Ahmed v. Crown Marchant bank Limited [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 295) 680 at 684; CCB (Nig.) Limited v. Onwuchekwa (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 647).

  39. Ibid at 694–695.

  40. Burry, note 48 at341–346; Khann, note 9 at1478; Linus, note 38 at309.

  41. Linus, note 38 at 309.

  42. Black’s Law Dictionary, 773; Longman Dictionary, 715, 842.

  43. Linus,note 38 at 309.

  44. Fine has been defined as “a pecuniary punishment or penalty imposed by a lawful tribunal or court upon a person convicted of crime and may be in addition to imprisonment”. See Black (1990).

  45. Linus,note 38 at 286.

  46. Montenegro Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Entity Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Montengro Nos.2/2007 and 13/2007 which provides for payment of fine as one of the sanctions against erring company, art13 (1). See also Serbian Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Entity Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No 97/08 of 27 October 2008, art13 (1).

  47. See Polinsky and Shavell (1984).

  48. Garry S. B,note 57 at193–198; Mitchell, A. Polinsky & S. S note 58 at 89, 95.

  49. 2010 Beijing Convention, art 4 (3).

  50. Ibid.

  51. Wells (1988). See also Posner (1980), Karpoff and Lott (1993).

  52. Khann, note 9 at1499–1502; Linus note 38 at 295–297.

  53. Braithwaite. J. and Geis, G. “On theory and Action for Corporate Crime. In “Crime and Deliquency” cited in Linus, note 38 at 295.

  54. Fisse, note 64 at 108; Williams, note 65 at 975; Braithwaite. J. and Geis, G, note 66 at 295; Linus, note 38 at 295–296.

  55. Linus, note 38 at 295.

  56. Etzioni, A, The US Sentencing Commission on Corporate Crime: a critique. In Geis and Jesilow eds, White Collar Crime 1993 at 147–156.; See also, Linus,note 38 at 294–296.

  57. Linus,note 38 at 294.

References

  • Ali LH (2008) Corporate criminal liability in Nigeria. Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, pp 284–285

    Google Scholar 

  • Alschuler A (2009) Two ways to think about the punishment of corporations. Am Crim Law Rev 46:1359

    Google Scholar 

  • Jennifer Arlen, Reiner Kraakman (1997) Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes. N Y Univ Law Rev. 72, 687, 692

  • Baker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76:169

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beale SS (2007) Is corporate criminal liability unique? American Criminal Law Review 44:1503–1504

  • Beale SS (2009) A response to the critics of corporate criminal liability. American Criminal Law Review 46:1481

    Google Scholar 

  • Beale SS, Safwat AG (2004) What development in Western Europe tell us about American critiques of corporate criminal liability. Buffalo Crim Law Rev 8:89–90

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black HC (1990) Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edn. United State West Publishing Co, St. Paul, p 333

    Google Scholar 

  • Brickey KF (1982) Corporate criminal accountability: a brief history and observation. Washington University Law Review 60(2):394

    Google Scholar 

  • Bucy PH (2009) Corporate criminal liability: when does it make sense? Am Crim Law Rev 46:1437

    Google Scholar 

  • Burry BB (1991) Organization theory and the criminal liability of organizations. Bull Rev 71:48

    Google Scholar 

  • Daniem VT (2010) September 11 inspired aviation counter terrorism convention and protocol adopted. ASIL, 15(3), p 101

  • Fisse B (1971) The use of publicity as a criminal sanction against business corporations. Melb Univ Law Rev 8:107–150

    Google Scholar 

  • Garner BA (ed) (2004) Black’s Law Dictionary, eight edn. Thomson West Publishing Co, USA, p 1562

    Google Scholar 

  • Garry S, Steve T (1999) Corporate Crime. Pearson Education Limited, United Kingdom, p 198

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamid AG (2011) Public International Law: A Practical Approach, Third edn. Sweet and Maxwell, Malaysia, p 129

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoover DV (2011) Universal jurisdiction not so universal: a time to delegate to the international criminal court. Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Conference Paper 52, 2011. 4

  • Karpoff JM, Lott JR Jr (1993) The reputational penalty firms bears from committing criminal fraud. J Law Econs 36:761

  • Khann VS (1996) Corporate criminal liability: what purpose does it serve? Harv Law Rev 109(7):1477

  • Menthe DC (1998) Jurisdiction in cyberspace: theory of international spaces. Mich Telecomm Tech L Rev 4(69):71

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore CA (1987) Timing the giant corporation? Some cautionary remarks on the Deterrability of corporate crime. Crime Delinq 33(2):395–396

    Google Scholar 

  • Piera A, Gill M (2014) Will the new ICAO-Beijing instruments build a Chinese wall for international aviation security? Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 47(145):1999

    Google Scholar 

  • Pitt HL, Groskaufmanis KA (1990) Minimizing corporate civil and criminal liability: a second look at corporate codes of conduct. GEO. L. J, 1563, 1559, 1570, 1573–1574

  • Polinsky MA, Shavell S (1984) The optimal use of fines and imprisonment. Pub Econ 24:89, 95

  • Posner RA (1980) Optimal sentences for white-collar criminals. American Criminal Law Review 17:409–410

  • Ribstein LE (2006) Perils of criminalizing agency cost. Ullinois law & Economics Research paper No. LE06-021

  • Salmond J (1947) In: Williams GL (ed) Jurisprudence 10th edn, pp 318

  • Weigend T (2008) Soecietas delinquere no potest? A German perspective J INT’L JUST 6:201

    Google Scholar 

  • Wells C (1988) The decline and rise of english murder: corporate crime and individual responsibility. Crim Law Rev 794–795

  • Williams G (1983) Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edn. Stevens & Sons, London, p 975

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mustapha Ismail Adua.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Ismail Adua, M., Abdul-Hamid, O.Y. Corporate criminal liability in the realm of aviation security: the 2010 BEIJING convention in focus. J Transp Secur 11, 53–63 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-018-0189-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-018-0189-x

Keywords

Navigation