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Political Changes in China Since the 19th CCP Congress: Xi Jinping Is Not Weaker But More Contested

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Abstract

Since the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping has continued to dominate the political stage. Having succeeded to abolish the two-term limit for the presidency in March 2018, he has consolidated even more his power, restructuring several Party and state agencies and promoting many supporters to key positions. He has also privileged very conservative policies, raising questions about China’s reform and open-door strategy. However, in the summer of 2018, in the context of a growing trade war with the US, his opponents have launched an offensive that has highlighted deepening divisions within the Party leadership and among the elites. While today Xi is more contested than before, his detractors have remained unable to weaken him, let alone to use the trade war with the US, to force him to radically change course.

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Notes

  1. Article 1 of the Constitution that before stated that “the socialist system is the fundamental system of the PRC” has been amended as follows: “the leadership of the CCP is the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Moreover, “the socialist rule of law” replaced the traditional formula “socialist legal system.”

  2. Li Dadong of Freezing Point and Xu Zhangrun (see below) have openly criticized the decision.

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  1. Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

    Jean-Pierre Cabestan

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Cabestan, JP. Political Changes in China Since the 19th CCP Congress: Xi Jinping Is Not Weaker But More Contested. East Asia 36, 1–21 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-019-09305-x

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