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Blum’s Puzzle and the Analiticity of Kripkean Identity Statements

  • Laureano Luna
Article

Abstract

We rely on a recent puzzle by Alex Blum to offer a new argument for the old Fitch’s thesis that what we learn a posteriori in Kripkean identity statements like ‘Tully is Cicero’ is contingent and what is not contingent in such statements is analytical, hence hardly a posteriori.

Keywords

Identity statements Rigid designators Direct designators A posteriori de re Modal axiom schema (K) 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Alex Blum for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyIES Doctor Francisco MarinJaenSpain

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