Abstract
In this discussion, I claim that the debate over ‘the bias towards the present’ turns on an axiological question. Is the value of a present experience greater than its value when past? I argue not and hold that our bias towards the present, understood as a pure time preference, is irrational.
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Notes
It matters not whether the value is understood to be impersonal or subject-relative.
The Presentist might respond: “Past headaches don’t exist, but they did exist.” However, even if the Presentist is entitled to say this, it does not help. How can something which does not exist have any value?
Parfit would agree. He wrote: “When we are discussing distribution, past pains count. Those who have suffered more have more claim to be spared future pain.” (Parfit 1978: 297)
Here is an alternative take on Prior’s example: what you are thanking goodness for is the temporally neutral fact that the headache was not longer than, e.g., one hour.
Thanks to Preston Greene for useful discussion.
References
Heathwood, C. (2008). Fitting attitudes and welfare. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in Metaethics, vol. 3 (pp. 47–73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (1978). Innumerate ethics. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7(4), 285–301.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prior, A. (1959). Thank goodness that’s over. Philosophy, 34, 12–17.
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Garrett, B. Experience and Time. Acta Anal 33, 427–430 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0338-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0338-z