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Using Samples-of-Opportunity to Assess Gender Bias in Principal Evaluations of Teachers: A Cautionary Tale

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Abstract

This paper uses two “samples-of-opportunity” datasets to examine whether principal evaluations of teachers differ systematically across genders after controlling for arguably gender unbiased measures of teacher productivity---namely value-added student test scores calculated relative to other teachers in the same grade/school (where teachers are randomly allocated to classrooms within the same grade/school). While the two datasets appear to be quite similar in nature, both were samples-of-opportunity in that they were not representative of any particular population. Our findings differ substantially across datasets. This exercise reveals how results in the education and discrimination literature may be sensitive to the sample used.

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Notes

  1. http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/leadoccupations.htm

  2. The Urban Institute also did a number of these audit studies in the early 1990s regarding racial discrimination in hiring. For example, see Turner et al. (1991) and Cross et al. (1990). Yinger (1986) uses a similar matched pairs audit type approach to look at racial discrimination by real estate agents in the housing market.

  3. Another related study is that of Doleac and Stein (2013), who look at racial discrimination among buyers by posting online ads selling Ipods and randomly assigning a picture of either a white hand or a black hand holding the Ipod. They then examined how responses and offers to the ad differed by the race of the hand holding the Ipod in the picture.

  4. Indeed, in Spurr’s (1990) analysis school rank also had no relationship with whether or not a lawyer was promoted to partner.

  5. Note this does not necessarily mean Xi is a gender unbiased signal of productivity as defined in the previous subsection. While the assumption that ui is mean zero for both genders assures E[θi|Xi,male] = E[θi|Xi,female], without further restricting the distribution of ui, we cannot rule out E[θji|Xi,male] = E[θji |Xi,female] for j > 1.

  6. Note, the reason we denote the signal observed by the employer as Xi rather than Si as used earlier, is because we want to emphasize that the productivity skill an employer observes might be different than the productivity signal the researcher observes, which is what we denoted as Si above.

  7. A handful of “pairs” were made up of more than 2 teachers, but each had at least one AC and one TC teacher.

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Correspondence to David Bjerk.

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Both authors have directly participated in the planning and execution of this research study, and have read and approved the final version submitted. The contents of this manuscript have not been copyrighted or published previously and are not now under consideration for publication elsewhere. Furthermore, this manuscript will not be copyrighted, submitted, or published elsewhere, while acceptance by the Journal is under consideration. The publisher will not be held legally responsible should there be any claims for compensation.

Appendix

Appendix

Principal Evaluation Questions IES

  • Reading/Language Arts Questions (all on a 1–5 scale)

    • Discerns learnings needs of students in reading/language arts?

    • Uses advance planning in reading/language arts?

    • Leads instructional activities during reading/language arts?

    • Modifies instructional activities during reading/language arts?

  • Math Questions (all on a 1–5 scale)

    • Discerns learnings needs of students in math?

    • Uses advance planning in math?

    • Leads instructional activities during math?

    • Modifies instructional activities during math?

  • Classroom Management Questions (all on a 1–5 scale)

    • Establishes and enforces classroom rules and procedures?

    • Manages classroom time to keep students on task?

    • Encouraged desired behavior through praise, support, etc.?

    • Engages students in learning?

    • Utilize parents and school resources?

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Bjerk, D., Ozbeklik, S. Using Samples-of-Opportunity to Assess Gender Bias in Principal Evaluations of Teachers: A Cautionary Tale. J Labor Res 39, 235–258 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-018-9271-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-018-9271-1

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