Artificial Morality. Concepts, Issues and Challenges
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Artificial morality is an emerging field in artificial intelligence which explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral capacities. Since this will have a deep impact on our lives it is important to discuss the possibility of artificial morality and its implications for individuals and society. Starting with some examples of artificial morality, the article turns to conceptual issues that are important for delineating the possibility and scope of artificial morality, in particular, what an artificial moral agent is; how morality should be understood in the context of artificial morality; and how human and artificial morality compare. Outlined next is how moral capacities can be implemented in artificial systems in general and in more detail with respect to an elder care system. On the basis of these findings some of the arguments that can be found in public discourse about artificial morality will be reviewed and the prospects and challenges of artificial morality are discussed.
KeywordsArtificial morality Artificial moral agents Moral implementation Self-driving cars Care robots
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