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Market behaviour and the to-trade-or-not-to-trade dilemma in ‘tradable white certificate’ schemes

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Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of market behaviour under ‘Tradable White Certificate’ (TWC) schemes. It focuses on the entire set of ‘flexibilities’ granted to obliged parties to meet a mandatory energy-saving target cost-effectively, i.e. range eligible measures, eligible end-use sectors, banking provision, market engagement of non-obliged parties, and trading as such. We found that market behaviour responds to the unique design and context in which TWC schemes are implemented. Contrary to expectations, limited trading is observed so the ‘to-trade-or-not-to-trade’ dilemma is further analysed. A real TWC market has emerged only in Italy, where obliged parties (i.e. energy distributors) show preference towards ‘to-trade’. In Great Britain and France, an autarky compliance approach is identified, with obliged parties (i.e. energy suppliers) showing preference towards ‘not-to-trade’ driven by, among many factors, commercial benefits of non-trading (e.g. increased competitiveness). At the same time, results show clearer indications of cost-effectiveness for Great Britain than for Italy. In general, high energy-saving effectiveness is observed, but low ambitious saving targets and pitfalls in the regulatory framework need to be considered to further develop TWC markets. Initial market and institutional conditions strongly suggest that trading might not be an immediate outcome. Ambitious energy targets can trigger a more dynamic usage of all flexibilities by eligible parties and thus active behaviour in TWC markets.

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Notes

  1. For a detailed description of TWC schemes, see Bertoldi and Rezessy in this special issue.

  2. Defined as whether a mandatory energy saving target is achieved at lowest possible costs.

  3. For further information, visit http://www.eurowhitecert.org.

  4. To be taken as different from the policy dilemma of whether a TWC scheme is or not the right policy choice.

  5. Notice that the acronyms EEC1, EEC2, and EEC3 are used to denote the first (2002–2005), the second (2005–2008), and the third phase (2008–2011) of the EEC, respectively.

  6. Although not yet implemented in current TWC schemes, a ‘borrowing’ option for non-compliance can also be introduced. This means that a party that does not comply with its target commits itself to a greater target for the next compliance period.

  7. The term ‘liquidity’ is used to refer to the characteristic of TWCs whereby they can quickly be converted into cash at a reasonably predictable price.

  8. Notice that throughout the paper, we sometimes refer to liquidity to address only one critical condition: the number of eligible parties.

  9. To complement the findings about the Italian TWC scheme, see other papers in this special issue.

  10. Under the Italian TWC scheme, notice that one TWC is equal to 1 tonne of oil equivalent (toe) or 11.63 MWh. Also, notice that obliged actors are allowed to comply with their saving obligation for a given year until May 31 of the following year.

  11. GME is in charge of the issuance of TWC management of the market. For further information, visit http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/En/Default.aspx.

  12. It has to be mentioned that the target for 2005 was actually 200,000 toe. However, the target to be achieved by obliged parties was approximately 155,000 toe. This is because approx. 50,000 toe could not be apportioned amongst companies that did not meet the apportionment criterion of having a minimum of 100,000 customers. At the time of research, apportionment criteria for these companies still remained to be developed.

  13. No further details about the specific measures implemented in industrial sector were disclosed by the Italian authority in charge of administering and enforcing the TWC scheme (i.e. AEEG)

  14. More recently, the Italian authority released some aggregated figures covering a more extensive period, from January 2005 to December 2006 (AEEG 2007). See Pavan in this special issue for more details.

  15. In Italy, three different M&V approaches exist (see AEEG 2006; Adnot et al. 2006a): (a) ex-ante approach or ‘deemed savings’, (b) engineering estimates that require some on-field measurement and relies on simplified energy saving calculation, and (c) an energy monitoring plan (i.e. an ex-post approach based on direct measurement of energy consumption before and after the project is implemented).

  16. This ‘early action’ provision granted to eligible parties was likely the result that the scheme was supposed to be implemented in 2002. However, several aspects challenged its political feasibility and the scheme was finally implemented in 2005.

  17. Defined as whether obliged parties meet or not a mandatory energy saving target.

  18. This is assuming average TWC prices of €71 and 94 in 2006 for electricity and gas, respectively (see “Trading activity”). Furthermore, we consider national tariffs of electricity and natural gas of approximately 5.6 and 6.8 Euro cents/kWh, respectively. Notice that 1 toe = 11,630 kWh.

  19. Energy savings in the British scheme are expressed in fuel standardised lifetime discounted terms. This means that to reflect the different levels of primary energy input to a kilowatt of electricity (including the carbon content), a differential is applied to energy savings. For instance, the number of kilowatt-hours of saving is multiplied by 0.56 for coal savings, 0.8 electricity savings, and by 0.35 for gas savings. For further details see DEFRA (2004b:10, 46).

  20. ‘Deadweight’ refers to the level of investment activity carried out by parties under ‘business-as-usual’. A deadweight factor is applied when energy savings from eligible measures are estimated (including costs).

  21. The resulting environmental effectiveness of the scheme can be summarised as follows. Target achievement under the EEC1 was expected to save around 0.5 MtC/year in 2010 (DEFRA 2006c: (1) Notice that this year was chosen as a benchmark because it is the mid-point of the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period. The 0.5 MtC figure was based on assumptions regarding standards of comfort and electricity generation, and heating fuel mixes projected by the authority (see DEFRA 2004b). Once implemented energy efficiency measures counting against target EEC1 are considered (not including banking to EEC2), emissions reductions equate to 0.4 MtC/year in 2010 (including a deduction for estimated deadweight). Considering total UK CO2 emissions to be approximately 150 MtC/year, of which household emissions contribute 40 MtC/year, the achieved emission reductions represent approximately 1%.

  22. In Great Britain, responsible parties must demonstrate that eligible measures would have not been implemented in the absence of the scheme. Additionality can then be justified in financial terms. For instance, landlords of social housing programmes can support obliged parties by providing written evidence of additionality. To implement eligible energy efficiency measures in low-income households, British obliged parties need to receive a written statement from the landlord stating that the measures would not have been implemented outside the programme. However, authorities recognise that it is difficult to draw the line between additional and non-additional measures when local energy efficiency programmes are in place.

  23. Saving targets for EEC1 and EEC2 are not directly comparable. This is because several assumptions in the methodology for estimating the EEC2 target are different from the ones used to determine the EEC1 target (e.g. time dependency of savings, discount rate, etc.). For further details see DEFRA (2004a).

  24. Usually, the development and usage of M&V approaches depend on the complexities of eligible measures, number of eligible end-use sectors, relevant data available (e.g. baseline, climatic conditions, lifetime and performance of measures, etc.), and the consensus and negotiation between policy makers, regulator(s) and obliged parties.

  25. Personal communication with Iris Rooney (DEFRA) and Charles Hargreaves (OFGEM), October 2005.

  26. Notice that estimates given by Mundaca (2007a; i.e. 0.8 and 1.3 Euro cents/kWh) include transaction costs borne by obliged parties. 1 British pound = approximately 1.41 euro as on December 2004.

  27. At 6.68 p/kWh (approx. 9.4 Euro cents/kWh) for electricity and 1.65 p/kWh (approx. 2.3 Euro cents/kWh) for gas. See DTI (2005). The authority has mentioned that the year 2004 can be taken as the “centre of gravity” of EEC1.

  28. At the time of research, there had been no study on transaction costs under the Italian TWC scheme, thus it remains to be seen whether the coverage of the scheme involves numerous sources and a heavy burden of transaction costs for parties.

  29. Mandatory energy saving targets are as follows: 130 TWh in Great Britain (period 2005–2008), 67 TWh in Italy (period 2005–2009), and 54 TWh in France (period 2006–2008).

  30. Note that issuances of TWCs is for 5 years in Italy, however for heating and air conditioning the issuance period goes up to 8 years.

  31. Note that under the Italian TWC scheme, 1 TWC = tonne of oil equivalent.

  32. This imply, for instance, that if a given saving measure implemented in 2005 generates 1,000 certificates during the 5 years of its lifetime, 200 certificates are to be issued in 2005, other 200 certificates are to be issued in 2006 and so on until 2009 unless, for some reason, the measure is not capable of generating the same 200 certificates in the years following 2005. In other words, saving measures employed to comply with the 2005 obligation continue generating the same amount of certificates during the following years depending on the year in which they were implemented and on the lifetimes of eligible measures.

  33. For further information about EESOP, see OFGEM and EST (2003).

  34. For further information, see DEFRA (2004a, 2005).

  35. In the created Italian TWC market, the criterion to define an obliged party addresses gas and electricity distributors serving more than 100,000 customers. This led the AEEG to identify 30 obliged companies (with 10 electricity and 20 gas distribution companies). A trade-off between the number of obliged parties and the complexity of the system to be administered is identified. For 2005, the total saving target apportionment criteria adopted in Italy implied that 22% of the total saving target was not apportioned. Lowering such threshold on the amount of clients served could have increased the total amount of savings apportioned. Nevertheless, such an action could have increased the administration burden for the authority to enforce and monitor the TWC scheme.

  36. Companies submitting an energy efficiency project for certification to the AEEG can be considered “ESCOs” if their object includes the provision of integrated services for the realisation and the subsequent possible management of energy-saving measures.

  37. For ESCOs, the minimum amount of energy savings to be realised is 25 toe/year in case the energy efficiency measures are evaluated via ex-ante approaches, 50 toe/year in case measures are evaluated via the so-called engineering approach, and 100 toe/year in case of measures are evaluated through monitoring plans (i.e. ex-post M&V).

  38. The regulator has stressed several times that it remains open to discuss modifications to the 28-day rule with actual evidence on whether the rule has restricted or undermined any benefits resulting from the provision of energy services.

  39. See Mundaca (2007a) for an analysis on the nature and scale of transaction costs under the British scheme.

  40. Interestingly, notice that the bilateral market under the EU-ETS is estimated to be substantial. Point Carbon (2007) estimates that the direct bilateral market doubled in size, from 100 Mt in 2005 to 200 Mt in 2006.

  41. Registered market actor pays an annual fee of €300 plus 20 Euro cents per each TWC exchanged either through bilateral contracts or on the market organised by GME.

  42. From the total number of actors, 76 obtained also the qualification of market operators by GME. Within this group, 21 are grid distribution companies, 49 are ESCOs and six are traders.

  43. High volatility is understood as sudden up and down movements of spot market prices over very short time periods.

  44. Ellerman (2003) uses a similar conceptual approach to address economic efficiency for the SO2 cap-and-trade programme in the US. The author looks at the emergence of the market and volume of permits traded as primary evidence for economic efficiency—welfare effects (e.g. social benefits and costs) are not taking into account.

  45. Notice that ex-post evidence of administrative and transaction costs has not yet been produced.

  46. Market power is herein understood as how an obliged party under a TWC scheme can manipulate the market to its own advantage.

  47. During the period January 2005 to May 2006, the number of buyers and sellers was distributed as follows (AEEG 2006): (a) On the demand side, 16 companies bought TWCs via bilateral contracts only, 13 companies bought TWCs on the open market only and seven companies used both options. (b) On the supply side, 10 companies sold TWCs via bilateral contracts only, six companies sold TWCs on the open market only, six companies used both options, and (c) five companies (two of which were obliged actors and three ESCOs) both bought and sold TWCs. With the exception of the five companies that both bought and sold TWCs, the AEEG did not specify whether the companies above-mentioned were obliged actors or ESCOs, or eligible gas and electricity distributors.

  48. Note that according to Bohi (1994), if the regulator determines favourable cost-recovery mechanisms, parties are unlikely to engage in trading even when the cost of certificates are lower— a situation that could be seen in Italy.

  49. For further information, visit http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/household/fuelpoverty/.

  50. Interviews with British obliged parties were carried in October 2005 and March 2006. Some results were partly published in Mundaca (2007a).

  51. Ibid.

  52. For details, see Urvoas (2007) and Urvoas et al. (2007).

  53. The term energy service refers to the delivered benefits of useful energy consumption such as heating, refrigeration, lightning, cooking, transportation, etc., as opposed to the simple provision of units of energy as such (see Blok 2006; Johansson and Goldemberg 2002).

  54. Such computational model automatically determines the number of TWCs available at a given price.

  55. Interviewees indicated that bilateral trading could be a preferred alternative compared to an open trading platform. This hypothesis is confirmed by the experience in Italy in which bilateral trades have dominated the trading activity so far.

  56. It has to be pointed out that the games carried out were in fact auctions instead of bilateral trade or trade via an exchange. This is because players were not informed about TWC spot price (at the opening of each market session, the ‘auction master’ gave only indications about TWC average price in previous sessions); the consequence of this was that there was only one way trade with the auction master according to pre-defined auctioning rules (how the TWCs exactly came from different saving potentials in different countries remained largely in the dark for the players).

  57. For example, it is remarkable that minimum and maximum price levels did not converge during the first simulation round; this fact in conjunction with the development of the average price level from Q1 to Q12 indicates that several participants either did not learn much (from an economic viewpoint) or were—at least in some quarters—guided by non-economic criteria. Personal communication with Adriaan Perrels (VATT), June 2006.

  58. For instance, one player decided to retain a surplus of TWC at the end of the obligation period, although no banking option was envisaged by the simulation rules established.

  59. To advance research in this area, future simulations should include a control group of players and explicitly represent obliged party’s decision-making behaviour as far as commercial benefits of energy efficiency are concerned. Behavioural and experimental economics can greatly contribute to this task.

  60. Evidence shows that many obliged parties were unfamiliar with trading during the beginning of the SO2 cap-and-trade programme in the US. This aspect motivated parties to exercise an autarky compliance policy (see Bohi 1994).

  61. See Mundaca (2007b) for a discussion on potential distributional socio-economic effects of an EU-wide TWC scheme.

  62. Using the official discount rate of 6% under EEC1, as well as upper and lower bound of social and environmental benefits.

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Acknowledgement

We thank the guest editors of this special issue and anonymous referees for proving useful comments. The paper builds mostly upon the work carried out under the EuroWhiteCert project (www.eurowhitecert.org). Financial support from the Intelligent Energy for Europe (EIE) Programme of the European Community is gratefully acknowledged (contract no. EIE/04/123/S07.38640). The usual disclaimers apply.

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Mundaca, L., Neij, L., Labanca, N. et al. Market behaviour and the to-trade-or-not-to-trade dilemma in ‘tradable white certificate’ schemes. Energy Efficiency 1, 323–347 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-008-9026-6

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