Shoot/No-Shoot Decisions in the Context of IED-Detection Training and Eyewitness Memory for Persons

Abstract

Cognitive approaches to training for the detection of improvised explosive devices (IED’s) are of increasing importance. However, there is a question as to the degree to which such training might interfere with other important law enforcement (LE) functions in the field, and the degree to which such training might enhance other important cognitive/perceptual functions. A promising cognitive approach to IED training, the SMOKE system, was provided to respondents, who then responded to shoot/no-shoot decisions, important LE situations of increasing relevance. It was shown that SMOKE training did not interfere with shoot/no-shoot decisions. However, those with SMOKE training performed better than control respondents on eyewitness memory for the perpetrator of a given crime in field-valid scenes. This indicates that cognitively based training may enhance vigilance and resultant memory in field situations.

Appendix 1

Brief Descriptions of the Five Error Types Addressed in the SMOKE System (summarized from Sharps 2017).

• 1. S- errors of SEARCH. For this error type, respondents focused on only one part of the environment in which mock-IEDs were deployed, or only on one plane, failing to look up or down.

• 2. M- errors of MOVEMENT. Some respondents remained in one place in the environment (a moderately cluttered room), frequently at the door. So, many areas of the room, behind and under things, were completely invisible to them; often there was no tendency to move about the room in an effort to take different necessary visual perspectives.

• 3. O- errors of OBSERVATION. In these errors, respondents looked directly at a given IED but did not report it, moving on to look at other things. This frequently happened with large, very visible IEDs. Respondents who made errors of Observation looked directly at IEDs clearly in view, and saw nothing dangerous at all.

• 4. K- failures to KEEP SEARCHING. In these instances, respondents might find a single bomb, or they might identify an innocuous object as a bomb, and then decide they had found everything there was to find. Respondents would report that they were finished looking, even in the presence of additional devices which remained undetected.

• 5. E- errors of EVALUATION. These occurred when respondents identified innocuous objects (such as a briefcase or a pillow) as IEDs. Some of these objects were plausible disguises for IEDs; others were not, ranging from the implausible to the absurd. What is important about these errors, however, is that they occurred when the actual mock-IEDs were in plain sight.