Abstract
While Plantinga has famously argued that acceptance of neo-Darwinian theory commits one to the rejection of naturalism, Plantinga’s argument is vulnerable to an objection developed by Evan Fales. Not only does Fales’ objection undermine Plantinga’s original argument, it establishes a general challenge which any attempt to revitalize Plantinga’s argument must overcome. After briefly laying out the contours of this challenge, we attempt to meet it by arguing that because a purely naturalistic account of our etiology cannot explain the correlation between our preference for simplicity and simplicity’s ability to serve as a veridical method of theory selection, the scientific realist is committed to the rejection of naturalism.
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Notes
Many thanks to Evan Fales for helping us see this concern.
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Graber, A., Golemon, L. Plantinga Redux: Is the Scientific Realist Committed to the Rejection of Naturalism?. SOPHIA 59, 395–412 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0695-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0695-0