Abstract
A number of analytic philosophers of religion have asserted what we will call proposition (T): If God creates the best possible world from an internal necessity alone, then God cannot be thankworthy with respect to creating the best possible world. According to (T), there is inconsistency between divine thankworthiness and the idea that God creates the best possible world from an internal necessity alone. In this article, however, I develop an argument for the consistency of divine thankworthiness and the idea that God creates the best possible world from an internal necessity alone, thus claiming that proposition (T) is false. An exploration into the Judeo-Christian doctrine of divine grace will expedite the argument. This doctrine (applied to God’s act to create the best possible world) will provide sufficient grounds for thinking that God is thankworthy with respect to creating the best possible world. I also argue that the idea that God creates the best possible world from an internal necessity alone can also be a gracious act. Along the way, I will consider possible objections to my argument.
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Notes
The charge that it is not possible to reconcile God’s essential perfect goodness with any significant degree of divine freedom is most clearly expressed by Rowe (2004, 2011). As Rowe says, ‘What I want to determine is whether there is a serious problem of reconciling God’s essential goodness and moral perfection with any significant degree of divine freedom. My principal aim is to show that there is a serious problem here’ (2011, 175–176).
Emphasis original. Elsewhere, Wierenga similarly states, ‘Let us apply the compatibilist’s insight to the case of God. Even if in some circumstance C God’s knowing that A is the best action, his wanting to do A, and his being able to do A is a logically sufficient condition of his doing A in C, it is nevertheless in virtue of his own nature that he knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is able to do A. There is no long chain stretching back to things separate from him that give him this constellation of knowledge, desire, and ability; it is due to his own knowledge and power and goodness. I see no reason not to say, accordingly, that God is free, even when he does what is best’ (Wierenga 2002, 434). Emphases original.
For similar outlooks where God is free even though there is something about his perfection which precludes him from being able to categorically act otherwise, see Rogers (2008), Talbott (2009), Couenhoven (2012), Timpe (2013, 2016). An interesting question at this point that cannot be dealt with here is whether such an outlook on God’s freedom (where God is free even though there is something about his perfection which precludes him from being able to categorically act otherwise) ought to be understood as compatibilist or incompatibilist. For compatibilist, see Couenhoven (2012); for incompatibilist, see Timpe (2013, 2016).
In this paper, I make no claims as to whether or not God deliberates among which possible world to create. I assume, however, that the idea that God creates the best possible world from an internal necessity alone is consistent with both a deliberative model and a non-deliberative model. For discussion as to whether or not God deliberates among which possible world to create, see Helm (2010), McCann (2012), and Gould (2014).
I hereafter drop the qualifier with respect to creating the best possible world.
Garcia sustains her criticism in Garcia (2011, 220).
Emphasis original.
While Klaas Kraay may or may not endorse proposition (T), he nevertheless also highlights the problem in Kraay (2008, 860-861).
It is worth noting that the structure of my argument is reminiscent of the structure of Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (1977). So, for our purposes, let N = God creates the best possible world from an internal necessity alone, T = God is thankworthy with respect to creating the best possible world, and G = God’s act of creating the best possible world was a gracious act. Accordingly, if a set of two propositions, N and G, is consistent and their conjunction entails T, then the conjunction of N and T is consistent.
Emphasis original.
One might claim that God’s grace ought to be understood as covenantal or similarly as the result of a promise. If this were the case, then God granting grace, it could be argued, would indeed be an obligation. However, in response, even if one concedes that God granting grace would indeed be an obligation, it could be argued that the actual making of a covenant (or promise) would be the fundamental act of graciousness since there is no obligation in initiating a covenant. I thank Paul Helm for bringing this to my attention.
I thank an anonymous referee for helping me get clear on (DGA).
Emphasis added.
David H. Kelsey also asserts that a divine act performed necessarily is inconsistent with that act being a gracious act: ‘[N]othing about the stories of God’s creating entails that God must necessarily also draw what is created to eschatological consummation or that God must reconcile them if they were alienated from God. Were it otherwise, neither God’s relating to draw creatures to eschatological consummation nor God’s relating to reconcile estranged creatures would be grace or gracelike. For grace is, by definition, not necessitated’ (Kelsey 2009, 121–122).
If one finds my argument (that divine grace provides a solution to the problem of the necessity of the best possible world and divine thankworthiness) to be unsound, perhaps (inspired by Senor) a different way to put the argument would be to state that benefit (rather than grace) provides a solution to the necessity of the best possible world and divine thankworthiness. Accordingly, it would be coherent for some subject S to benefit from God’s act performed necessarily, and thus God can be thankworthy for such an act.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Jesse Couenhoven, Paul Helm, James McGlothlin, Katherin Rogers, and Thomas Senor for critical remarks and fruitful discussion on earlier drafts of this article.
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Daeley, J.J. The Necessity of the Best Possible World, Divine Thankworthiness, and Grace. SOPHIA 58, 423–435 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0687-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0687-0