Abstract
Proponents of the problem of animal suffering state that the great amount of animal death and suffering found in Earth’s natural history provides evidence against the truth of theism. In particular, philosophers such as Paul Draper have argued that regardless of the antecedent probability of theism and naturalism, animal suffering provides positive evidence for the truth of naturalism over theism. While theists have attempted to provide answers to the problem of animal suffering, almost none have argued that animal suffering and death can be seen as positive evidence for theism. This essay will discuss several arguments from the writings of Thomas Aquinas that can be used to show that animal suffering and death are to be expected in theistic universes. In the first section, I discuss evidential arguments for naturalism from animal suffering. Next, I provide an overview of Aquinas’ arguments, particularly in Book II of the Summa Contra Gentiles. After this, I discuss the implications these arguments have for theistic universes. Finally, I conclude that these arguments refute evidential arguments for naturalism from animal suffering and also provide evidence that favors theism.
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Notes
The concept of nomic regularity is an example of an attempt to predict the kind of universe that a theistic God would create. But no contemporary philosophers have made arguments that are similar to Aquinas’ arguments for a hierarchy of beings.
Aquinas presents these in detail at Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) II, 45; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ST) I, 47.
All quotes from the Summa Theologiae are from Aquinas 1947.
Aquinas (ST I, 7, 4) agrees with Aristotle and believes that an actual infinite multitude is impossible. Thus, Aquinas believes that God cannot create a universe with an actually infinite number of beings. If this possibility is eliminated, God must choose between the infinite number of universes that do not include actually infinite multitudes.
All quotes from the Summa Contra Gentiles are from Aquinas 1975.
As mentioned earlier, Aquinas (ST I, 7, 4) rejects the possibility of an actual infinite multitude. So this would not entail that God must create an infinite number of forms.
This is also because as immaterial beings without a material cause, it is impossible for there to be more than one number of each species of angel because there is nothing to numerically individuate one from another (ST I, 50, 2).
Brian Davies is a major proponent for the view that Aquinas’ philosophy entails that God is not a moral agent. For example, see Davies 2006, pp. 84–105.
Laura Garcia (2009) provides a good discussion of the difficulties that even non-Thomistic philosophies face in the attempt to interpret God’s moral perfection in terms of deontological, consequentialist, and virtue theories of ethics. She argues that virtue theories provide the least problematic interpretation of God’s moral perfection.
I use the term ‘natural’ here to refer to death and suffering that is caused solely by natural processes. This is opposed to death and suffering that is caused by the freely willed choices of rational beings.
Aquinas (ST I, 97, 1, ad 3) does not think that humans were naturally immortal before the Fall. This entails that all sentient creatures in a theistic universe are subject to death and suffering.
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Keltz, B. God’s Purpose for the Universe and the Problem of Animal Suffering. SOPHIA 58, 475–492 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0611-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0611-z