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Matthias Heuft, Dirk Feldhusen

Angriffe auf Chips in Reisepässen

Seitenkanalanalysen auf RSA Implementierungen

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Zusammenfassung

Elektronische Reisepässe verwenden als optionales Sicherheitsmerkmal die ,active authentication‘. Hierzu wird vom Chip des Reisepasses eine RSA-Signatur mit dem geheimen Schlüssel des Chips gerechnet, um die Authentizität des Dokumentes nachzuweisen. In einer Studie konnten in zwei Fällen Schwachstellen aufgedeckt werden, die den geheimen Schlüssel kompromittieren.

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Heuft, M., Feldhusen, D. Angriffe auf Chips in Reisepässen . Datenschutz Datensich 44, 436–440 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-020-1301-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-020-1301-5

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