Abstract
This article analyzes R & D investment decisions in an asymmetrical case. The investment decisions share three important characteristics. First, the investment is completely irreversible. Second, there are two kinds of uncertainties over the future returns from the investment and over technology in R & D process, respectively. Third, there is strategic competition in the asymmetrical case. This article presents the optimal investment threshold values and the optimal investment rule of high-efficient firm (leader), and shows that the investment threshold values are reduced by competition of two firms. Finally, the mixed investment strategies for two firms, the probability that each firm separately exercises the option to invest, and the probability that two firms simultaneously exercise the option are given in the paper.
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This work is supported by Post Doctor Science Foundation of China (2003034479) and Natural Science Foundation of China (70671047).
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Xue, M., Gong, P. R & D Strategic Investment in an Asymmetrical Case. Jrl Syst Sci & Complex 19, 547–557 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-006-0547-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-006-0547-9