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Philosophia

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Formulating Moral Objectivity

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Abstract

Objective moral facts are supposed to be independent from us, but it has proven difficult to provide a clear account of this independence condition. Objective moral facts cannot be overly independent of us, as even an objective morality would depend, in important respects, on features of us. The challenge is to respect these moral mind-dependencies without inappropriately counting too many moral facts as objective. In this paper, I delineate and evaluate several different versions of the independence condition in moral objectivity. I raise problems for these ways of formulating moral objectivity and then develop a better account of moral objectivity, one that avoids the pitfalls of other proposals.

Keywords

Ethics Moral constructivism Moral realism Moral objectivity 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Moti Gorin, Sabine Roeser, the audience members at Fort Lewis College, and several anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyColorado State UniversityFort CollinsUSA

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