Journal of Computer Science and Technology

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 823–837 | Cite as

A Two-Player Coalition Cooperative Scheme for the Bodyguard Allocation Problem

  • José Alberto Fernández-ZepedaEmail author
  • Daniel Brubeck-Salcedo
  • Daniel Fajardo-Delgado
  • Héctor Zatarain-Aceves
Regular Paper


We address the bodyguard allocation problem (BAP), an optimization problem that illustrates the conflict of interest between two classes of processes with contradictory preferences within a distributed system. While a class of processes prefers to minimize its distance to a particular process called the root, the other class prefers to maximize it; at the same time, all the processes seek to build a communication spanning tree with the maximum social welfare. The two state-of-the-art algorithms for this problem always guarantee the generation of a spanning tree that satisfies a condition of Nash equilibrium in the system; however, such a tree does not necessarily produce the maximum social welfare. In this paper, we propose a two-player coalition cooperative scheme for BAP, which allows some processes to perturb or break a Nash equilibrium to find another one with a better social welfare. By using this cooperative scheme, we propose a new algorithm called FFC-BAPS for BAP. We present both theoretical and empirical analyses which show that this algorithm produces better quality approximate solutions than former algorithms for BAP.


bodyguard allocation problem coalitional game graph algorithm Nash equilibrium 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • José Alberto Fernández-Zepeda
    • 1
    Email author
  • Daniel Brubeck-Salcedo
    • 1
  • Daniel Fajardo-Delgado
    • 2
  • Héctor Zatarain-Aceves
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Center for Scientific Research and Higher Education of EnsenadaEnsenadaMexico
  2. 2.Department of Systems and ComputationInstituto Technológico de Ciudad GuzmánGuzmánMexico

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