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Greece and the Western Financial Crisis

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Abstract

Greece and the other crisis nations of the Western financial crisis are, to a large extent, victims of a dysfunctional international monetary system that has caused multiple financial crises since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973. In the Eurozone, the government bond market allowed the government of Greece to borrow at favorable rates without taking into account the possibility of default until it was too late. The capital from the surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands being the most prominent, created housing price booms and housing construction in Ireland and Spain, while the public sector borrowed in Portugal and Greece. The problem of the recipient countries was magnified by imperfect institutions, such as inefficient financial supervision or an inefficient or corrupt political establishment. Thus, financial integration magnified local problems and made them take on an international dimension. The burden of adjustment within the Eurozone has been left largely with the debtor countries. The surplus countries have not reduced their current account surpluses. Though macroeconomic and public sector imbalances have been reduced in Greece, the country continues to lose its young through emigration and a vibrant export sector has not emerged.

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Notes

  1. See Aliber (2019) on capital flows and financial crises.

  2. A number of explanations have been put forth to explain the puzzle, such as Coakley et al. (1996) who attributed the finding to countries being concerned about their current account balances since persistent current account deficits raise the risk of a hard landing of the economy. In a more recent paper, Giavazzi and Blanchard (2002) repeated the Feldstein-Horioka estimation using more recent data and found that the puzzle appears to be disappearing in the Eurozone where the coefficient is falling towards zero indicating greater capital market integration and the absence of a relationship between saving and unemployment.

  3. See Calvo (1998) on sudden stops of capital inflows.

  4. See Benediktsdottir et al. (2011) and Johnsen (2014) on Iceland’s financial crisis. Johnsen summarized and extended the results of a parliamentary investigation. See Honohan (2010), Lane (2011, 2014), Bergin et al. (2011), Kinsella (2014) and Ó’Riain (2014) on the Irish crisis. See Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis (2011) on the Greek crisis.

  5. They grew by 11.3% in 2008 and 11.7% in 2009; mostly because of lower imports which fell by 18.2% in 2008 and 24% in 2009 while exports increased by 7.1% in 2008 and 6.2% in 2009.

  6. There is also the paper by Olafsson and Pétursson (2010) who explained the variation in the post-crisis experience of a sample of 46 countries and found that greater exchange rate flexibility coincided with a smaller and shorter contraction and increased the risk of a banking and currency crisis.

  7. See Akerlof and Romer (1993) on bankruptcy for profit. The case can also be made (Dooley 2019) that access to international capital flows increases the incentive for banks to choose a high-risk strategy by making it possible to attract vast amounts of deposits that can be used to generate short-term profits. This makes it possible for bank owners to withdraw bank revenues exceeding the expected loss of capital when the bank fails. In this case, capital controls in the form of required reserves on foreign deposits at domestic financial institutions make the high-risk strategy less attractive to the bank owners.

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Correspondence to Gylfi Zoega.

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Zoega, G. Greece and the Western Financial Crisis. Atl Econ J 47, 113–126 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-019-09614-9

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