NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies

  • Zhe YangEmail author
  • Haiqun Zhang


Inspired by Scarf (J Econ Theory 3: 169–181,  1971), Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28: 25–34, 1999), Sandholm (Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) and Yang and Zhang (Optim Lett., 2018), we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.


Coalitional population game NTU core TU core Strong equilibria Existence 



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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsShanghai University of Finance and EconomicsShanghaiPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics (SUFE)Ministry of EducationShanghaiPeople’s Republic of China

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