Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value

  • Dongshuang Hou
  • Aymeric LardonEmail author
  • Panfei Sun
  • Hao Sun


The main purpose of this article is to introduce the weighted ENSC value for cooperative transferable utility games which takes into account players’ selfishness about the payoff allocations. Similar to Shapley’s idea of a one-by-one formation of the grand coalition [Shapley (1953)], we first provide a procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value depending on players’ selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition. Second, in the spirit of the nucleolus [Schmeidler (1969)], we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion relying on players’ selfishness.


TU-game Weighted ENSC value Allocation scenario Selfish complaint 



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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied MathematicsNorthwestern Polytechnical UniversityXanChina
  2. 2.Université Côte d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEGCôte d’AzurFrance

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