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Are moral norms distinct from social norms? A critical assessment of Jon Elster and Cristina Bicchieri

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This article offers a critical assessment of Cristina Bicchieri and Jon Elster’s recent attempt to distinguish between social, moral, and quasi-moral norms. Although their typologies present interesting differences, they both distinguish types of norms on the basis of the way in which context, and especially other agents’ expectations and behavior, shapes one’s preference to comply with norms. We argue that both typologies should be abandoned because they fail to capture causally relevant features of norms. We nevertheless emphasize that both Bicchieri and Elster correctly draw attention to important and often neglected characteristics of the psychology of norm compliance.

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Correspondence to Jean-François Grégoire.

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Dubreuil, B., Grégoire, JF. Are moral norms distinct from social norms? A critical assessment of Jon Elster and Cristina Bicchieri. Theory Decis 75, 137–152 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9342-3

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