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Synthese

, Volume 195, Issue 5, pp 1993–1999 | Cite as

Rigidity and triviality

  • Fredrik Haraldsen
Article

Abstract

Though it is often claimed that some general terms are rigid designators, it has turned out to be difficult to give a satisfying definition that (1) avoids making all general terms rigid (the overgeneralization problem), and (2) even if a non-rigid reading is available, makes that non-rigid reading matter (the trivialization problem). Several authors have attempted to develop examples that meet the trivialization challenge, with Martí and Martínez-Fernández providing what is, perhaps, the most convincing strategy. I show that the type of example Martí and Martínez-Fernández offer nevertheless fails to meet the trivialization challenge and, accordingly, that we should still have serious doubts about whether continuing the search for a non-trivial definition of general term rigidity would be fruitful.

Keywords

General terms Rigidity Natural kinds Trivialization problem 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Ka Ho Lam and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Funding

The research behind this article was made possible in part through a grant from the SASPRO Mobility Programme of the Slovak Academy of Sciences [Grant Number 0086/01/03/-b].

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophySlovak Academy of SciencesBratislavaSlovakia

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