A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy
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The standard epistemic justification for inclusiveness in political decision making is the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that the probability of a correct decision using majority rule increases in group size (given certain assumptions). Informally, majority rule acts as a mechanism to pool the information contained in the judgements of individual agents. I aim to extend the explanation of how groups of political agents track the truth. Before agents can pool the information, they first need to find truth-conducive information. Increasing group size is also important in the initial search for truth-conducive information.
KeywordsEpistemic democracy Condorcet Jury Theorem Search procedure
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