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Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 7, pp 1233–1252 | Cite as

A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy

  • Christopher ThompsonEmail author
Article
  • 269 Downloads

Abstract

The standard epistemic justification for inclusiveness in political decision making is the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that the probability of a correct decision using majority rule increases in group size (given certain assumptions). Informally, majority rule acts as a mechanism to pool the information contained in the judgements of individual agents. I aim to extend the explanation of how groups of political agents track the truth. Before agents can pool the information, they first need to find truth-conducive information. Increasing group size is also important in the initial search for truth-conducive information.

Keywords

Epistemic democracy Condorcet Jury Theorem Search procedure 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LSELondonUK

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